In this work, I examine the impact of state-level regulation of Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs) on the increase in the use of Refund Anticipation Checks (RACs) and on taxpayer outcomes. Both RALs and RACs are products offered by tax-preparers that provide taxpayers with an earlier refund (in the case of a RAL) or a temporary bank account from which tax preparation fees can be deducted (in the case of a RAC). Each product is costly compared with the value of the refund, and they are often marketed to low-income taxpayers who may be liquidity constrained or unbanked. States have responded to the potentially predatory nature of RALs through regulation, leading to a switch to RACs. Using zip-code-level tax data, I examine the effects of various state-level policies on RAL activity and the transition of tax-preparers to RACs. I then specifically analyze New Jersey’s interest rate cap on RALs, a regulation that was accompanied by greater enforcement of existing tax-preparer regulations. Employing an empirical strategy that uses variation in taxpayer location, which should be uninfluenced by tax preparers’ decisions to provide these products and a state’s decision to regulate them, I find increases in RAL and RAC use for taxpayers living near New Jersey’s border with another state. Furthermore, I find that these same border taxpayers reported more social program use and more persons per household—a finding that is in line with the results of similar research into the effects of short-term borrowing on family finances.