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27TH
DIVISION
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
IN THE
WORLD WAR




PREPARED BY THE
AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS
COMMISSION



27th Div Case B

JS



CASE

B



27TH
DIVISION
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
IN THE
WORLD WAR



PREPARED BY THE
A.S. AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
PRINTING OFFICE

1944

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Foreword

THE AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION was created by Congress in 1923 for the purpose of commemorating the services of American forces in Europe during the World War. In the accomplishment of this mission, the Commission has erected suitable memorials in Europe and improved and beautified the eight American cemeteries there. It has also published a book entitled "American Armies and Battlefields in Europe" which gives a concise account of the vital part played by American forces in the World War and detailed information regarding the memorials and cemeteries.

In order that the actions of American troops might be accurately set forth, detailed studies were made of the operations of each division which had front-line battle service. In certain cases studies of sector service were also prepared. It is felt that the results of this research should now be made available to the public. Therefore, these studies are being published in a series of twenty-eight booklets, each booklet devoted to the operations of one division.

In these booklets only the active service of the divisions is treated in detail. The accounts, however, are comprehensive enough to be of general interest and establish a great body of fact concerning the operations. For the military student, they provide an excellent background for tactical studies and present an extensive list of sources upon which further study can be based.

AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION


CHAIRMAN

M223133

PREFACE

IN READING the booklets of this series it should be borne in mind that they are based on historical studies which were prepared by the American Battle Monuments Commission primarily for the purpose of determining the front line of each American division for each day of its active operations. Consequently, they were essentially front-line infantry studies. The operations of other arms, movements of reserves and other phases of the operations were covered only in sufficient detail to afford a complete understanding of the infantry action.

The preparation of these studies was begun soon after the Commission was created, and every precaution was taken to insure that the research would be conducted with the utmost accuracy and thoroughness. A number of officers from the Regular Army as well as from the Marine Corps were selected and detailed to the Commission from time to time to carry on the work. All records of the War Department pertaining to the subject were exhaustively examined, as were the French, British and German documents which had been collected by the Army War College. From these sources, the daily front lines of each division were determined and plotted on large-scale maps, and brief accounts of the operations were prepared. The maps and accounts of operations were then referred to officers of the divisions concerned for comment and additional information. They were normally sent to officers of all ranks down to and including company commanders. In cases of doubtful or controversial points, the reference was carried further. The replies received were carefully studied, evaluated and used to correct and amplify the original studies. In this way, the Commission was able to secure and preserve valuable data which otherwise would have been lost.

In these booklets, it has not been the purpose to go far beyond the scope of the original studies. However, casualty and strength tables have been added and enough other material

has been included to present connected histories of the divisions from their organization until the conclusion of their service in Europe, and to portray their actions in proper relationship to the operations of the corps and armies with which they served.

In order to indicate to the reader the areas in which the divisions served, a general map of France and Belgium has been included in each booklet. This map shows the principal cities and the battle lines of July 17 and November 11. In addition, it shows, by special symbol, certain localities of particular interest to the division concerned.

All dates are 1918 unless otherwise indicated and are inclusive; for example, October 9-11 includes the three days, October 9, 10 and 11. Dates in the headings of chapters dealing with operations, and in the titles of accompanying maps, are in general the dates between which one or more infantry regiments of the division have been awarded battle honors by the War Department. In certain cases infantry regiments, as well as other elements of the division, have been awarded battle honors for dates other than those indicated. The dates on the battle lines of the maps include the period during which the division held command. The lines are as of midnight unless otherwise indicated; for example, October 9 indicates the line held at midnight, October 9.

The operation maps are reproductions of maps commonly used by American forces during the World War. In a great number of cases it was necessary to use parts of two or more sheets of the wartime maps to make one operation map, which accounts for the different treatments of topographical detail often found on the same operation map. Names which appear on the maps in the abbreviated form are spelled in full in the text. A table of abbreviations with the French equivalent and English translation appears in the front of each booklet. Names of certain topographical features which are well known, and are frequently referred to, appear in the text in the Anglicized form; for example, Argonne Forest rather than Forêt d'Argonne, Marne River rather than Marne Rivière.

The casualty figures are based on the official casualty records of The Adjutant General. Tables of casualties have been prepared, however, only for the periods of active operations. The

purpose is to show the casualties which occurred under the division command during specific actions. Therefore, casualties of elements which were detached during the actions are not included, while casualties of elements of other divisions which were attached have been included. It will be noted that, in the majority of cases, the dates in the casualty tables cover longer periods than those in the chapter headings or on the maps. This was found necessary in order to include all casualties incident to entering or leaving the line.

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IX

ABBREVIATIONS

A. E. F.—American Expeditionary Forces

B. (Bois)—wood

Chau. (Château)—chateau

excl.—exclusive

Fe. and Fme. (Ferme)—farm

Fm.—farm

G. H. Q.—General Headquarters

incl.—inclusive

M. (Mont)—mount

Pt. (Petit)—small

Rau. (Ruisseau)—brook

Riv. and Rivre. (Rivière)—river

T. and Tr. (Tranchée)—trench

Organization, and Service from Arrival in the A. E. F. until July 24

THE 27TH DIVISION was organized at Camp Wadsworth, South Carolina, in September 1917, from National Guard troops of the State of New York. In the early spring of 1918 the division was brought to full strength by the addition of selective service men. [1]¹

The principal units of the division were:

<p><i>53d Infantry Brigade</i></p> <p>105th Infantry Regiment</p> <p>106th Infantry Regiment</p> <p>105th Machine-Gun Battalion</p>	<p><i>54th Infantry Brigade</i></p> <p>107th Infantry Regiment</p> <p>108th Infantry Regiment</p> <p>106th Machine-Gun Battalion</p>
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52d Field Artillery Brigade


<p>104th Field Artillery Regiment (75-mm guns)</p> <p>106th Field Artillery Regiment (155-mm howitzers)</p>	<p>105th Field Artillery Regiment (75-mm guns)</p> <p>102d Trench-Mortar Battery</p>
---	--

Divisional Troops

<p>104th Machine-Gun Battalion</p> <p>102d Field Signal Battalion</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Trains</p>	<p>102d Engineer Regiment</p> <p>Headquarters Troop</p> <p style="text-align: right;">[1]</p>
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The details of organization of the American infantry division were changed from time to time during the World War. Under the tables of organization which were in use in the American Expeditionary Forces on November 11, 1918, and which, in general, were in force during 1918, the maximum authorized strength of the division was 991 officers and 27,114 men. Its principal armament was 24 155-mm howitzers, 48 75-mm guns, 12 6-inch trench mortars, 260 machine guns and 16,193 rifles.

¹ The figures in brackets at the ends of paragraphs refer to the sources on which the statements in the paragraphs are based. All sources are listed in the appendix (p. 39).





Further details concerning the composition of the American infantry division appear in the table on page 37. The divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces seldom attained the maximum authorized strength shown on page 1. The actual strength of the 27th Division on certain dates is shown in the table on page 38. The approximate strength of the division for other dates may be obtained by applying to these figures the battle losses which appear in the casualty tables following the accounts of battle operations. [2]

On April 28 the division began to move to the ports of embarkation of Newport News and Hoboken. Sailings commenced in May, elements of the division landing at Brest and St. Nazaire. Following its arrival in France, the division, less the 52d Field Artillery Brigade, was sent to the British area for training. The artillery brigade went to Camp de Souge for training. It did not rejoin the division during the period of hostilities, but served with the 33d Division in the Verdun-Fromeréville Sector from September 10 to 25, and in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive from September 26 to October 21. It served with the 79th Division in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive from October 28 to November 11. [1]

The division was assigned to the British Fourth Army and on May 26 moved to the Rue-Buigny training area, about 20 kilometers north of Abbeville, where it was affiliated with the British 66th Division for training. On June 16 the 27th Division moved to the vicinity of Abbeville. It was assigned to the British Third Army on June 18, and on June 21 moved to the vicinity of Beauval and Doullens, about 25 kilometers north of Amiens. Here the infantry trained in the forward area and all troops were available for the defense of rear positions. On June 30 the division was assigned to the British Second Army, and two days later began to move to the area of that army southwest of Ypres. Upon its arrival in the army area, it was assigned to the British XIX Corps. On July 9 the division was designated to organize and defend a portion of the East Poperinghe Line, which was the third defensive position in the Dickebusch Lake and Scherpenberg Sector, on the north face of the Lys salient. [1]

Dickebusch Lake and Scherpenberg Sector and Ypres-Lys Offensive

DICKEBUSCH LAKE AND SCHERPENBERG SECTOR,
JULY 25—AUGUST 18

YPRES-LYS OFFENSIVE, AUGUST 19—SEPTEMBER 3

ON MARCH 21 the Germans launched the first of their great offensives by which they hoped to win the war before the American army could take the field in force. The front of attack included the point of junction of the British and French armies, and before the Germans were checked they had driven a large salient into the Allied lines near Amiens. The lines of the Amiens salient had scarcely stabilized when, on April 9, the Germans launched another offensive south of Ypres. Attacking on both sides of Armentières, they crossed the Lys River and pushed rapidly down its valley in the direction of Hazebrouck, 28 kilometers southwest of Ypres. Before the close of the operation on April 27, the Germans had driven another salient into the British lines, taken the dominating heights of Mont Kemmel and were approaching Hazebrouck. Although these offensives failed to separate the British and French armies or break through to the channel ports, they created a serious situation with regard to Allied communications on this front by bringing the important railroad junctions of Amiens, Béthune and Hazebrouck under effective artillery fire. [3, 4, 5]

Another of these blows was directed against the French. On May 27 the Germans attacked between Berry-au-Bac, about 17 kilometers northwest of Reims, and the Oise River, and advanced rapidly to the Marne. Before this offensive was checked a salient bounded roughly by Reims, Château-Thierry and Soissons had been driven into the Allied lines. German offensives for the purpose of widening the Marne salient, launched on June 9 and July 15, failed. [3, 47]

While these German offensives failed to accomplish their

purpose, they strained the Allies to the limit of their reserves and made it necessary to send American divisions to different parts of the front for immediate service with the British and French armies. [3, 47]

By mid-July a sufficient number of American troops had arrived to allow the Allies and Americans to pass to the offensive. On July 18, with the aid of a number of American divisions, a successful counteroffensive was launched against the Germans in the Marne salient. On July 24, while this offensive was still in progress, a strategic offensive plan for the American and Allied armies was agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The immediate purpose of this plan was to reduce the salients which interfered with important railroad communications which paralleled the front. [3, 47]

On the British front, it was of primary importance to disengage Amiens and free the Paris—Amiens railroad by reducing the Amiens salient. The Somme Offensive, the initial purpose of which was to accomplish this, was launched on August 8. Plans were also formulated to reduce the Lys salient. However, the Somme Offensive forced the Germans to shorten their lines by gradually withdrawing from the Lys salient. The operations in following up this retirement and maintaining pressure on the retreating enemy constitute the opening phase of the Ypres-Lys Offensive which began on August 19. [4, 77]



The following paragraphs, in *italic*, are a synopsis of the service of the 27th Division in the Dickebusch Lake and Scherpenberg Sector and the Ypres-Lys Offensive. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

While the 27th Division occupied a portion of the East Poperinghe Line, a reserve position of the Dickebusch Lake and Scherpenberg Sector, elements of its battalions, affiliated with British troops, trained in the front line. On July 25 battalions of the

division began to take over front-line positions. On August 19 sector service on this front merged into the Ypres-Lys Offensive. The 27th Division relieved the British 6th Division on August 23. The division placed the 53d Infantry Brigade in the front line with its regiments abreast. The British 34th Division was to the right, the American 30th Division to the left.

Information of an enemy withdrawal was received on August 31, and on the same day the division advanced its front line about 1 kilometer against weak resistance. The attack was renewed and the line advanced on the right during the morning of September 1. Another attack was made in the afternoon, but some of the ground gained was lost as the result of a local German counterattack. At the close of the day the maximum gain was about 1 kilometer on the extreme right. No formal attack was made by the division on September 2, but the front line was advanced to the east bank of Wyttschaete brook (Wyttschaetebeek). This placed the division line about 2 kilometers in advance of the line it held prior to the advance of August 31. The division was relieved by the British 41st Division on September 3.

The 27th Division, as part of the British XIX Corps, British Second Army, began the relief of the French 71st Division in the East Poperinghe Line, the reserve position in the Dickebusch Lake and Scherpenberg Sector, southwest of Ypres, on July 5. On the 9th the division was assigned the command of a sector on the East Poperinghe Line with a front of approximately 4 kilometers. During the period that the division occupied the rear position, elements of its battalions received front-line instruction with the British 6th and 41st Divisions. The 27th Division was supported at this time by the artillery of the British 66th Division. [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]

On July 25 infantry battalions of the 27th Division began to take over parts of the front line. The occupation of the sector was continued in this manner until after August 19, the date established by the War Department as the beginning of the Ypres-Lys Offensive. [4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 77]

The British XIX Corps had, on August 15, directed the

July 25-
Aug. 30

27th Division to relieve the British 6th Division, except its artillery, during the nights of August 22-23 and 23-24. Command was to pass at 10 p. m., August 23. On August 20 the 27th Division issued orders for the relief, which directed the 53d Infantry Brigade to relieve the two British brigades in the front line. The 108th Infantry was to be placed in reserve of the front line, while the 54th Infantry Brigade, less the 108th Infantry, was charged with the defense of the second position. The relief was carried out as ordered. The 53d Infantry Brigade occupied the line east of Dickebusch with regiments abreast, the 106th Infantry on the right. Each regiment had two battalions in front line and one in support. The front line extended from a point about 2 kilometers north of Mont Kemmel to the vicinity of Elzenwalle. Occupation of the sector was uneventful until August 30. [9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 77]

The British 34th Division was to the right of the 27th Division, and the American 30th Division, British II Corps, to the left. [18, 19]

On August 27 the British Second Army directed the British XIX and II Corps to transfer the Dickebusch and Canal Sectors to the American II Corps on August 30. The orders were rescinded, however, before the transfer was effected. [20, 21, 22, 23, 24]

At 10 p. m., August 30, the 27th Division received a telegram from the British XIX Corps to the effect that the enemy was believed to be retiring, and that the divisions to the right of the 27th Division had been ordered to reconnoiter to determine the situation. The 27th Division was also directed to reconnoiter. In compliance, it ordered the 53d Infantry Brigade to push out patrols during the night to discover any movement on the part of the enemy. [9]

Aug. 31 At 9:27 a. m., August 31, information was received by the division from the 106th Infantry that a reconnaissance patrol of its right battalion had found no signs of the enemy during the night. Later it was learned that other patrols had encountered resistance. Front-line companies of the 106th Infantry reported unusual quiet during the night of August 30-31. [9, 25]

At 10 a. m. a telegram was received from the XIX Corps reporting that the enemy had retired from Mont Kemmel. The division was ordered to advance in conjunction with the British 34th Division, to a general line, Lindenhoek—Vierstraat—point 800 meters south of Voormezele. The portion of this line in the right of the zone of the 27th Division was known as the Vierstraat Switch. [9]

In conformity with these orders, the division directed the 53d Infantry Brigade to move forward at once to occupy and consolidate the objective within the following zone of action:

Right boundary: Mille Kruis (excl.)—Rossignol Wood (incl.).

Left boundary: Vijverhoek—point 800 meters south of the church in Voormezele.

The advance was to be covered by patrols well to the front, followed by one company in each battalion zone of advance. The 54th Infantry Brigade was ordered held in readiness. [9, 12, 26]

The 53d Infantry Brigade advanced in the following formation:

53D INFANTRY BRIGADE

<i>105th Infantry</i>	<i>106th Infantry</i>
3d Battalion	3d Battalion
1st Battalion	1st Battalion
2d Battalion	2d Battalion

[12, 27, 28, 29]

Both regiments sent forward patrols and prepared to support them. The enemy's old front line was occupied without resistance. Farther to the front, however, patrols of the 106th Infantry, on the right, encountered machine-gun fire, especially from the line, Siege Ferme—point 750 meters west of Vierstraat. These positions were later occupied by the attacking troops, and the regiment completed the occupation of the Vierstraat Switch by 3 p. m. The patrols of the 105th Infantry were delayed for a time by fire from enemy positions 700 meters north of Vierstraat. By 4 p. m., however, the advance was completed and the objective consolidated. The British 34th Division advanced beyond Mont Kemmel. The extreme left of the 27th

Division line was refused to insure contact with the American 30th Division, which did not advance. [9, 12, 17, 30, 31]

At 6:30 p. m. the division received orders prescribing the line of resistance to be occupied that night and directing a renewal of the attack on September 1. Pursuant to these orders, the division directed that the positions gained as a result of the day's operation would be held as the line of resistance. The right boundary was extended to include the road extending east from Rossignol Wood to a point 1,500 meters east of the wood. The first objective was to be a line extending south from Vierstraat to the divisional right boundary. The advance to this objective was to be preceded by an artillery preparation commencing at 3:30 a. m. At 7 a. m. the right regiment, well covered by strong patrols, was to attack, maintaining contact with troops advancing to its right. During the movement of the right regiment to the first objective, the left regiment was to remain on the line of August 31 and continue the consolidation of its position. The objective was to be consolidated and the entire division held in readiness for a farther advance the same day. [9, 32]

The 106th Infantry prescribed that the attack would be made in column of battalions, in the same order as on August 31. [33]

At 10:10 p. m. the division was informed of orders of the British Second Army which directed the British XIX Corps to effect the relief of the 27th Division by 8 a. m., September 3. The 27th Division was to be prepared to entrain about midnight, September 3, for the area of the British Third Army. [34, 35]

Sept. 1 The 106th Infantry attacked as ordered on September 1. Machine-gun nests were overcome and by late forenoon the assault battalion had gained the designated objective. [9, 36]

At 9:40 a. m. the British XIX Corps had ordered the division to be prepared to advance after the capture of the first objective to a second objective about 2 kilometers farther east on the western slope of Wÿtschaete ridge. The 53d Infantry Brigade ordered the attack continued, with boundaries extended as follows: Right, to southern corner of Grand Bois—Martess Farm; left, to a point 100 meters north of White Chateau. [9, 17, 37]

The 105th Infantry ordered its 1st and 3d Battalions to pivot on the left of the 3d Battalion and advance to the second objective. The 106th Infantry ordered the 1st Battalion to pass through its 3d Battalion and advance to the second objective. [38, 39]

At 2:40 p. m. the British XIX Corps directed the division to advance to the second objective. The advance was begun in the late afternoon. Before dark elements of the 106th Infantry had advanced about 750 meters, but were forced by a counter-attack and heavy machine-gun fire from Petit Bois and Byron Farm, to retire to a line 100 to 200 meters in rear of the line gained by the attack in the morning. This former line was held during the night. The 105th Infantry advanced its right a short distance to maintain contact with the 106th Infantry and moved its left forward about 400 meters to the Grand Bois—Voormezele road. [12, 36, 40]

The divisions to the flanks advanced their lines during the day and maintained contact with the 27th Division. [17, 18, 36]

As a result of the day's action it was apparent that the enemy had stopped his retirement and was holding the western slope of Wyttschaete ridge in force. [36]

The 27th Division issued orders for the relief of the front-line units of the 53d Infantry Brigade by the British 41st Division during the night of September 2-3. Command of the sector was to pass at 10 a. m., September 3. [41, 42]

No general attack was planned for September 2, but the 53d Infantry Brigade was ordered to advance the front line as far as possible. This was done with the assistance of artillery fire which harassed the enemy's new main position. The pressure was continued during the day, and the line advanced slightly beyond Wyttschaete brook (Wyttschaetebeek), where the relief of the front-line elements was carried out during the night. [9, 36, 43]

The divisions to the flanks continued to hold their positions on the 2d with only a slight advance by the division to the right. [18, 44]

The relief of the 53d Infantry Brigade was completed during the morning of the 3d, and command passed to the British

Sept.
2-3

41st Division. On the following day the 27th Division moved to the zone of the British Third Army, and took station near Doullens in British General Headquarters reserve. [1, 9, 45, 46]

CASUALTIES, DICKEBUSCH LAKE AND SCHERPENBERG SECTOR
AND YPRES-LYS OFFENSIVE

Units	July 5- Aug. 30	Aug. 31- Sept. 7	Total	
105th Inf.....	W.....	103	103	206
	DW.....	9	7	16
	K.....	21	24	45
106th Inf.....	W.....	216	286	502
	DW.....	9	15	24
	K.....	30	52	82
107th Inf.....	W.....	157	3	160
	DW.....	9	1	10
	K.....	30	-----	30
108th Inf.....	W.....	81	-----	81
	DW.....	4	2	6
	K.....	11	-----	11
104th MG Bn.....	W.....	7	-----	7
	DW.....	2	-----	2
	K.....	4	-----	4
105th MG Bn.....	W.....	7	35	42
	DW.....	1	2	3
	K.....	1	4	5
106th MG Bn.....	W.....	37	-----	37
	DW.....	1	-----	1
	K.....	7	-----	7
102d Engrs.....	W.....	35	3	38
	DW.....	2	-----	2
	K.....	-----	-----	-----
Others.....	W.....	8	5	13
	DW.....	1	-----	1
	K.....	1	-----	1
Total.....	794	542	1,336	

W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action.

Somme Offensive and Subsequent Service

SOMME OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 24—OCTOBER 22
SUBSEQUENT SERVICE, OCTOBER 23, 1918—MARCH 1919

BY THE MIDDLE of September the Allied and American offensives, which had been made possible by the rapid increase in the number of American troops in France, had eliminated the German salients which interfered with essential railroad communications. One of these, the St. Mihiel salient, had been reduced by the American First Army, which had been organized on August 10. [3, 47]

The elimination of these salients made it possible to undertake the great converging offensives which had been agreed on by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief early in September. These offensives included the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, to be launched on September 26 by the American First Army, supported on its left by the French Fourth Army; a renewal of the Somme Offensive on September 27; and a renewal of the Ypres-Lys Offensive by a combined Allied attack east of Ypres on September 28. Between these principal offensives, secondary operations were to be undertaken. [4, 47, 49, 50]

By this time the Somme Offensive had accomplished its initial purpose. The Amiens salient had been reduced, thus disengaging Amiens and freeing the Paris—Amiens railroad. The French First Army and British Fourth, Third and First Armies, from right to left, held a line from the Oise River south of St. Quentin to the Scarpe River north of Cambrai. These armies were confronted by a portion of the Hindenburg Line, the great German defensive system which extended from the vicinity of Metz to the North Sea. On this front, the Hindenburg Line consisted of a zone of field fortifications from 6 to 9 kilometers in depth. In organizing their defenses between St. Quentin and Cambrai, the Germans had taken full advantage of the banks and tunnel of the St. Quentin Canal. In the

renewal of the Somme Offensive, it was planned to penetrate the Hindenburg Line and advance on Maubeuge, an important railroad center in the German communications. The British Third and First Armies were to attack on September 27. The British Fourth Army, supported by the French First Army, was to attack on September 29. [4]



The following paragraphs, in *italic*, are a synopsis of the service of the 27th Division in the Somme Offensive. This synopsis is designed to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

During the night of September 24-25 the 27th Division relieved the British 18th and 74th Divisions, British III Corps, British Fourth Army, opposite the Hindenburg Line, west of Bony. Command passed to the 27th Division on the morning of September 25. Since the British III Corps had failed to secure the designated line of departure for the general attack against the Hindenburg Line which was to be launched on September 29, the American II Corps, composed of the American 27th and 30th Divisions, was given the mission. The 27th Division was ordered to make the necessary advance on September 27.

At 5:30 a. m., September 27, the 106th Infantry attacked with the general line, Bois de Malakoff—The Knoll, as its objective. An advance was made, but the gains could not be held. The net result was a small gain on each flank. The 53d Infantry Brigade was relieved by the 54th Infantry Brigade during the night of September 27-28.

The mission of the II Corps in the general attack of September 29 was to secure the objective, Nauroy—Gouy. Upon reaching this line, the Australian Corps was to pass through the II Corps and continue the attack. The 27th Division advanced against the Hindenburg Line in column of brigades with the 54th Infantry Brigade leading. The resistance offered by the enemy strongpoints in Guillemont Ferme, Quennemont Ferme and on The Knoll seriously impeded the progress of the 27th Division. The Australian

units advanced to effect the passage of lines about 11 a. m. and, together with the troops of the 27th Division, took Quennemont Ferme and continued until checked in the main enemy position south of Bony. The Knoll was taken in hard fighting and held against counterattacks. Guillemont Ferme was not taken. Troops of the 53d Infantry Brigade, intended to be used for exploitation, became engaged in the fight. Small parties of the leading waves worked forward toward the canal. The latter part of the day was devoted to consolidation of the positions and reorganization of the troops.

The Australian 3d Division prepared to renew the attack on September 30 in the zone of action of the 27th Division, and in the early morning hours of the 30th assumed command of the front. Elements of the 27th Division remained in action on this day and assisted in the attack against the main line of resistance of the Hindenburg Line.

The Australian Corps continued to advance and reached the vicinity of Montbrehain, 15 kilometers southwest of St. Souplet, where the American II Corps relieved it by placing the 30th Division in line. This division attacked on October 8 and advanced on this and successive days until St. Souplet was taken on October 11.

After having been relieved by the Australians, the 27th Division assembled in the Péronne area on October 2. It was in corps reserve during the attack by the 30th Division which began on October 8. On the 12th the 27th Division relieved the 30th Division along the line, Vaux-Andigny—St. Souplet—St. Benin (exclusive). The British 6th Division, British IX Corps, was to the right, and the British 50th Division, British XIII Corps, to the left. Until October 17 the activities of the division were limited to patrolling and adjustments of lines. The 30th Division entered the line to the right of the 27th Division on October 16.

On October 17 the division attacked with brigades abreast with the line, Jonc de Mer Ferme—le Roue Ferme as its first objective, and a line of exploitation near Catillon. At the close of the first day's fighting the division stood on the general line of the road north of L'Arbre de Guise. The attack was renewed the next day, and the front line was advanced to a general north-south line through Jonc de Mer Ferme. With the British 25th Division

now to its left and the American 30th Division still to its right, the 27th Division again advanced on October 19 to a general north-south line through La Jonquière Ferme. The division was relieved on this line by the British 6th Division on October 21.

Sept. 24-25 On September 20 the 27th Division was released from British General Headquarters reserve for the purpose of participating in the Somme Offensive. Two days later it was assigned to the British III Corps, British Fourth Army, and moved to the advance zone of that army. On September 24 it became corps reserve. [1]

Pursuant to orders of the British III Corps, the 27th Division relieved the British 18th and 74th Divisions during the night of September 24-25. The 53d Infantry Brigade took over the front line with the 106th Infantry between Malakoff Ferme and a point about 400 meters northwest of Le Tombois Ferme. The regiment placed its 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions in the front line, in that order from right to left. The 105th Infantry took over the support positions. The 54th Infantry Brigade was in division reserve in the Tincourt—Haut-Allaines area, 20 kilometers west of Le Catelet. Command passed to the 27th Division at 10 a. m., September 25. [9, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59]

On this day the 27th Division was assigned to the American II Corps which was affiliated with and under the tactical command of the Australian Corps. To the right of the 27th Division, the American 30th Division, II Corps, had entered the line on September 24. To the left was the British 12th Division, British III Corps. [1, 9]

In the resumption of the Somme Offensive, it was planned that the British Third and First Armies would launch their attack on September 27, and that the British Fourth Army, supported on its right by the French First Army, would attack on September 29. The artillery preparation was to begin on the whole front during the night of September 26-27. This plan was adopted in order that the British Third and First Armies might secure early in the operation certain positions which would allow the artillery of the British Fourth Army to

get into position more readily. The plan also allowed a longer artillery preparation on the front of the British Fourth Army, where the positions of the enemy were of exceptional strength. [4]

It was intended that the British III Corps would have secured the outlying defenses of the Hindenburg Line before the 27th Division entered the line. This had not been accomplished. Therefore, the 27th Division was directed to carry out this preliminary operation on September 27. The assault echelon was to consist of the three battalions of the 106th Infantry. The objective was the line, Bois de Malakoff—Quennemont Ferme—Guillemont Ferme—The Knoll. An advance to this line would include the rearmost trenches of the outer defenses of the Hindenburg Line. The boundaries of the division were extended, the right to include Bois de Malakoff, and the left to a point about 700 meters south of the church in Vendhuile. The attack was to be supported by artillery and machine-gun barrages, and accompanied by four tanks per battalion. The 30th Division, to the right, was to reach a position in prolongation of the right of the 27th Division. No advance was to be made by the British division to the left. [9, 60]

Orders for the preliminary operation were issued by the 53d Infantry Brigade and the 106th Infantry on September 26. Companies K and M, 105th Infantry, were designated to protect the left flank by moving forward in rear of the 106th Infantry to occupy Crellin Trench from Le Tombois Ferme to The Knoll, and connect with the 106th Infantry on the objective. [61, 62, 63, 64, 65]

Sept. 26

The 106th Infantry attacked at 5:30 a. m., September 27. Heavy artillery fired concentrations beyond the objective, while light artillery fired a rolling barrage. The 105th and 106th Machine-Gun Battalions also fired a barrage. Tanks designated to assist the 1st Battalion on the right failed to get into action. On the left, a few tanks advanced, some moving around Guillemont Ferme and The Knoll. Under cover of the barrage, the assault companies reached the general line of the objective, getting into the trenches in some places and in others reaching the wire. Footholds were gained around Quennemont Ferme,

*Sept.
27-28*

Guillemont Ferme and The Knoll. Strong resistance developed from these three strongpoints. This resistance, together with machine-gun fire from the rear and flanks, as well as counter-attacks through the ravines and communication trenches leading from the enemy main line of resistance, made consolidation impossible. Parts of the line withdrew, leaving small isolated parties remaining in shell holes. [9, 55, 68, 69]

On the right, the 1st Battalion, near Quennemont Ferme, was counterattacked about 1 p. m. and forced to retire. At 7:30 p. m. patrols were sent out by this battalion from the line of departure to the objective, but were unable to locate any troops, either hostile or friendly. The 2d Battalion, in Tranchée de la Claymore, near Guillemont Ferme, was unable to dislodge the enemy from the farm and the vicinity. The 3d Battalion, on the left, was counterattacked about 12:20 p. m. and driven from the positions gained on The Knoll. Companies K and M, 105th Infantry, encountered similar opposition on the flank, and were unable to hold their positions near The Knoll when the 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry, was forced back. The line held by the 53d Infantry Brigade by evening of the 27th was the same as the line of departure, except for a slight advance on each flank. [9, 12, 69, 70]

The 30th Division, to the right, advanced its extreme left slightly during the day. The British 12th Division, to the left, engaged in minor patrol activities along its front without advancing its front line. [72, 73]

The Australian Corps had issued its field orders on September 22 for the general attack which was to be launched on the 29th. These orders directed the II Corps to attack the Hindenburg Line in conjunction with the British IX Corps to its right. The British III Corps was to protect the left and, if opportunity offered, capture Vendhuile. The objective was the line, Nauroy—Gouy. This attack by the II Corps was to be the first phase of the operation. When this objective had been gained the Australian 5th and 3d Divisions were to pass through the 30th and 27th Divisions and continue the advance to the second objective, the line, Joncourt—Wiancourt—Beaurevoir, 5 kilometers north of Joncourt. The flanks of the attack were

to be covered by a smoke screen. When the II Corps had reached its objective, the smoke screen was to be shifted to cover exploitation to both flanks by the 30th and 27th Divisions. [55]

On September 26 the 27th Division had issued orders for the general attack. The 54th Infantry Brigade was to relieve the 53d Infantry Brigade in the front line during the night of September 27-28 with regiments abreast, the 108th Infantry on the right. The relief was to be completed before daylight, September 28. After the relief, the 53d Infantry Brigade, less one battalion, 106th Infantry, was to move to reserve. One battalion, 106th Infantry, was to be stationed west of Ronsoy at the disposal of the 54th Infantry Brigade for use in the main operation as support of its left regiment. All three machine-gun battalions were to remain in the front line. [66]

Orders issued by the 27th Division at 1:55 p. m., September 27, indicated that the British 18th Division, British III Corps, would advance with the left of the 27th Division as far as the St. Quentin Canal. The zone of action of the division was as follows:

Right boundary: Malakoff Ferme (incl.)—Vallée Sout.

Left boundary: Le Tombois Ferme (incl.)—Hargival Ferme.

[74]

The formation prescribed for the attack was as follows:

54TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

<i>107th Infantry</i>		<i>108th Infantry</i>	
1st Battalion	3d Battalion	3d Battalion	2d Battalion
	Prov Bn, 106th Inf	1st Battalion	
	2d Battalion		

DIVISION RESERVE

105th Infantry

[74, 75, 79, 80, 81]

The 54th Infantry Brigade was to advance to the first-phase objective following the artillery barrage, which was to rest 15 minutes on a line 500 meters east of the canal tunnel to permit the attacking units to reorganize. On reaching the first objec-

tive the 107th Infantry was to extend to the left and exploit north about 300 meters beyond the left boundary.

In accordance with orders issued by the brigade and the regiments, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 108th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 107th Infantry, were to attack to the first objective. The 1st Battalion, 107th Infantry, was to advance to the canal and support by fire the movement of the 2d Battalion, 107th Infantry, east and north of the canal. This latter battalion was to cross the canal, pass through the Provisional Battalion of the 106th Infantry, and attack northeast to its designated objective. The mopping up of the zone of advance and of the canal and tunnel was to be done by the 1st Battalion, 108th Infantry, the Provisional Battalion, 106th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 107th Infantry. [74, 80, 81]

The left flank of the attack was to be protected by exploiting with reserve troops of the division. They were to extend the operation to the north, thereby securing the base of the salient which would result from the execution of the second phase of the attack. This exploitation to the left flank of the corps was to be carried to the second-phase objective by the 105th Infantry, which, prior to the attack, was to be posted in rear of the 107th Infantry. Upon reaching the canal tunnel, the 105th Infantry was to change direction to the left and deploy in depth in rear of that portion of the 107th Infantry detailed for extension to the left. At 11 a. m. it was to advance to a special objective, a line from a point approximately 1,500 meters northeast of the northeast exit of Le Catelet to a point approximately 1,700 meters north of Vendhuile. Upon reaching this line the 105th Infantry was to consolidate its position and establish contact with the Australian division, which would then be to its right and the British division to its left. Special care was enjoined upon the regiment to avoid possible interference with a British division advancing across the canal from Vendhuile. The regiment was to be relieved on this line by the British 38th Division, British V Corps, during the night of September 30-October 1, after the crossings of the canal at Vendhuile had been made available by the British III Corps. [74, 75, 76, 78]

The artillery and machine-gun barrage on the front of the 27th Division was to be similar to that of September 27. The 104th Machine-Gun Battalion was to support the left of the division. The American 301st Tank Battalion was attached to the division, with one company assigned to operate with each assault regiment. [69]

The relief of the 53d Infantry Brigade by the 54th Infantry Brigade was begun about 6 p. m. on the 27th and continued through the night. According to the original plan for the general attack, the line of departure was to have been the objective of the preliminary attack of the 106th Infantry on September 27, and arrangements had been made for the barrage to move forward from that line. The fact that the preliminary operation had not gained its objective rendered the execution of the general attack more difficult. Owing to the presence of isolated parties and American wounded in advance of the line, and the confusion which would result from changing the artillery plan on such short notice, the British Fourth Army decided that the starting line of the barrage would not be changed. The 27th Division was directed to form for the attack as far forward as possible. Both incoming regiments, therefore, pushed forward strong patrols to locate the isolated elements of the 106th Infantry, and to establish the line of departure as near to the objective of the preliminary operation as possible. These patrols located a few members of the 106th Infantry. [9, 12, 55, 67, 71]

On September 28 the 106th Infantry formed all of its available troops into the provisional battalion for the attack. The plan of using the regiment in the second phase of the operation was abandoned. [69, 82]

The day of the 28th was spent in unsuccessful attempts to advance the line of departure, and in completing preparations for the general attack which was to be launched at 5:50 a. m., September 29. [69, 83]

The division attacked at the designated hour. The infantry advance started 1 kilometer in rear of the rolling barrage, which permitted the machine guns in the three main strongpoints of the enemy line, the two farms and The Knoll, to maintain a *Sept. 29*

heavy fire on the attacking forces from the opening of the attack. Owing to mist and low clouds visibility was poor during the morning. Smoke from the barrage interfered with observation and the maintenance of direction. Many of the tanks assigned to support the attack were blown up in the wire by land mines or by shellfire. [9, 55, 84, 85]

On the right, the 2d Battalion, 108th Infantry, met determined resistance from Quennemont Ferme. Part of this battalion remained near the farm, keeping up the action to capture it. With the approach of a brigade of the Australian 3d Division about 11 a. m., the resistance here was overcome. Part of the battalion attacked with the Australians in the afternoon, making a slight advance. The remainder of the battalion continued beyond the farm, and making a detour to the south in order to pass through the wire, reached the main position of the Hindenburg Line south of Bony. The trenches there were captured and prisoners taken. Parties worked up through the trenches toward Bony. Several counterattacks made through the trenches extending south from Bony were repulsed. This force retained possession of its prisoners and defeated attempts of the enemy to dislodge it. It was still holding its position when Australian forces reached it. [12, 69, 86]

A portion of the 3d Battalion, 108th Infantry, passed Guillemont Ferme, but was checked west of Bony by fire from the town. The advance of the remainder of the battalion was checked by fire from the farm. Both parts of this battalion held these positions until they were joined later in the day by the Australians. The support battalion was checked after moving forward about 400 meters. [12, 69]

In the zone of action of the 107th Infantry, the 3d Battalion encountered stiff resistance from Tranchée de l'arbre and Guillemont Ferme. The battalion passed north of the farm and stopped in front of Tranchée de l'arbre, where the fight was continued. Some groups continued on toward the enemy main position. A detachment of tanks which attempted to assist the battalion was destroyed, and the greater portion of the battalion retired to the trenches west of the farm. Here, joined by a small force from the 105th Infantry, the advance

was renewed. Australian troops reached the battalion's front line about 3 p. m. Several local counterattacks were repulsed. At 6:30 p. m. elements of the combined troops moved forward on the left, but were ordered about 9:30 p. m. to retire to the trenches north of Guillemont Ferme. Parts of this combined force returned to the vicinity of Le Sart Ferme, where they were placed in support. [12, 69]

The extreme left assault element, the 1st Battalion, 107th Infantry, advanced against heavy fire to the general line of The Knoll and trenches to the southeast, with some groups pressing beyond. Machine-gun fire from the top of the ridge 600 meters to 1 kilometer distant and up Vallée de Macquincourt checked farther progress. The Knoll was taken after severe fighting. Enemy counterattacks from the northeast were repulsed, and the positions gained were maintained throughout the day. Tanks which attempted to assist the line beyond this trench were disabled. The fighting in this area absorbed not only the 1st Battalion, but also parts of the 2d Battalion. The 2d Battalion, 107th Infantry, worked forward to the general vicinity of Guillemont Ferme, some of its elements advancing into the enemy main position. [12, 69]

The Provisional Battalion, 106th Infantry, advancing in rear of the 3d Battalion, 107th Infantry, as moppers-up, entered the fight with the 107th Infantry when that regiment was checked near the trenches between Guillemont Ferme and The Knoll. Some of its members continued toward the canal with the scattered parties of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 107th Infantry. [69, 87]

The 105th Infantry, in reserve, moved forward at H-hour in column of battalions, the 2d, 1st and 3d in that order from head to rear. Owing to a dense smoke screen about 300 meters southwest of Le Tombois Ferme, the leading battalion failed to maintain its distance from the attacking troops. The advance was continued through the smoke by some of the leading platoons, others taking shelter in shell holes from the intense machine-gun fire from The Knoll. Elements of all three battalions advanced to the trenches southeast of The Knoll and were organized into provisional companies. An attempt by

the enemy to work down from the ridge to the east in force into Tranchée l'arbre was checked by these troops. The 1st and 3d Battalions veered to the left in the smoke toward The Knoll and got into the zone of action of the division to the left. Elements of these two battalions gained portions of Tranchée Ouest Macquincourt and vicinity, but filtered back to the trenches in the immediate vicinity of The Knoll. The regiment was unable to push on to its objective across the canal as planned. Small groups along the line of the division passed through the fire from the enemy strongpoints and reached the enemy main position and the canal. Organizations were considerably intermingled, particularly on the left, owing in large part to heavy losses among the leaders of the attacking units. [12, 69, 88]

At 11 a. m. the situation was as follows: the 2d Battalion, 108th Infantry, was mopping up Quennemont Ferme; the 3d Battalion had parts of two companies west of Bony; other elements of the battalion were held up in the vicinity of Guillemont Ferme; the 2d and 3d Battalions, 107th Infantry, with elements of the Provisional Battalion, 106th Infantry, were in the trenches between Guillemont Ferme and The Knoll; the 1st Battalion, 107th Infantry, intermingled with the 105th Infantry, was in the trenches in the vicinity of The Knoll. [12]

About this time the Australian 3d Division ordered its leading brigades, the 11th and 10th, from right to left, to push forward and assist the attacking troops to reorganize. The 9th Brigade, in reserve, was ordered to hold itself in readiness to move southward at short notice into the area which had been gained by the American 30th Division. From here it was to exploit northward and attack the Hindenburg Line from the flank. Throughout the remainder of the morning little progress was made against the sustained hostile fire. At 1 p. m. broken telephone communication between the Australian 3d Division and the Australian Corps was restored, and orders were received by the former to move forward and assist the advanced American troops. The two leading Australian brigades were instructed by their division to make a concerted attack with tanks at 3 p. m. The reserve brigade was ordered to move on

a broad front in rear of the left brigade to protect the left from any attack from the north, and to occupy and consolidate immediately ground gained by the leading brigades. At 3 p. m. the Australian infantry and detached groups of Americans began to move forward, but met such intense fire that farther advance during daylight was impossible. As a result of the supporting action by the Australian 3d Division, the right of the line was advanced to the trenches south of Bony. On the left, no farther advance was made. [55, 89, 90]

The 27th Division ordered a reorganization of the line. The 54th Infantry Brigade was to take over the right portion of the zone of action and the 53d Infantry Brigade the left. At 5 p. m. the division ordered the left flank secured and a defensive line prepared. The division was to establish contact with the Australian 3d Division to the right and the British 18th Division to the left. A defensive line was organized approximately on the morning line of departure, elements of the 105th, 106th and 107th Infantry Regiments furnishing the garrison. Three companies of the 102d Engineers were ordered to take a position in reserve north of Ronssoy. [12, 69, 91, 92]

The 30th Division advanced its lines during the day, and captured Bellicourt. The British 18th Division relieved the British 12th Division to the left of the 27th Division and advanced toward Vendhuile. [93, 94]

A battalion of the Australian 9th Brigade, in reserve, was placed near Le Tombois Ferme for flank protection. This brigade was warned of the probability of being moved southward through the captured area for exploitation north through the main position of the enemy. At 7 p. m. the Australian Corps ordered the brigade moved south for this purpose. It was to attack with the Australian 5th Division north along the Hindenburg Line on the morning of September 30. At 8:30 p. m. preliminary instructions covering the maneuver were issued to the brigade. Owing to lack of time, the mission was given, at 10:20 p. m., to those battalions of the Australian 11th Brigade nearest the position from which the operation was to start. The Australian 9th Brigade was to move two battalions

to the area, Guillemont Ferme—Bois de Malakoff, to be placed at the disposal of the Australian 11th Brigade. The Australian 14th Brigade, Australian 5th Division, was to attack on the right through Le Catelet; the Australian 11th Brigade was to attack to the left of this, mop up the canal tunnel and trenches, and occupy Bony, Le Bouton and the canal; the Australian 10th Brigade was to operate eastward with strong patrols and join the battalions of the Australian 11th Brigade as the latter moved north through the Hindenburg Line. [89]

Sept. 30 At 12:28 a. m., September 30, a telegram from the Australian Corps was received by the 27th Division directing that command of the forward area of the division would pass forthwith to the Australian 3d Division. Command passed at 3:35 a. m. [69, 89]

In the zone of action of the 30th Division, command in the forward area passed to the Australian 5th Division at 1:05 a. m. [94]

During the day American troops in the rear positions remained in support in the same positions as on the night of September 29-30. By arrangement between the 27th Division and the Australian 3d Division, elements of the former on the front line, some under American, some under Australian command, moved forward with the Australians and continued the attack at 5 a. m., September 30, cleaning up the Hindenburg Line on the right, and taking the defenses southwest of Bony. The trenches around Guillemont Ferme and The Knoll were cleared of the enemy. [9, 94, 95]

By evening of the 30th, after a day of severe fighting, a line was established from the point where the right boundary of the 27th Division crossed the tunnel, to a point about 600 meters southwest of the church in Bony, thence along Tranchée Croissant de Guillemont, Tranchée de l'arbre and Knoll trench. [89]

Personnel of the 27th Division that had remained in the fight were ordered late in the day to withdraw from the forward area and reorganize in the rear. [89]

Under instructions from the Australian Corps, arrangements were made by the Australian 3d Division and the 27th

Division to effect a withdrawal of American troops on the support line after 5 p. m. At 3 p. m. the 27th Division issued orders for all organizations of the division occupying the defensive line to revert to normal command and administration. Movement of the troops to the rear began during the night. [12, 69, 96]

At 1:30 a. m., October 1, the 27th Division issued orders covering a movement to the Péronne area. Provision was made for such elements as remained in the front line with the Australian 3d Division to rejoin the division at a later date. Troops continued to move from the front lines to the rear for assembly on October 1 and 2. The division moved to the new area as army reserve under the American II Corps. [12, 48, 97, 98, 99, 100]

Oct.
1-2

On October 4, the II Corps was ordered to relieve the Australian Corps during the night of October 5-6. The 30th Division made the relief, the 27th Division being designated corps reserve. The 30th Division attacked on October 8, 9 and 10, reaching the general line, Vaux-Andigny—St. Martin Rivière—St. Souplet—St. Benin. [101, 102, 103]

Oct.
3-11

From October 6 to 9 the brigades of the 27th Division were moved by stages to the front. In compliance with orders of the American II Corps on October 10, the division moved to the vicinity of Prémont, about 9 kilometers west of Vaux-Andigny. It was warned to be prepared to relieve the 30th Division during the night of October 11-12. [101, 104]

At 11:15 a. m., October 11, the II Corps ordered the 27th Division to relieve the 30th Division during the night of October 11-12. Command was to pass to the 27th Division at 10 a. m., October 12. At 12:55 a. m. the corps notified the division that, upon the completion of the relief, it would gain the line, Molain—St. Souplet—St. Benin if this line had not already been reached. If attempts to cross the Selle River should meet with strong resistance, a line was to be established on the west bank. Patrols were to be pushed across the river, but no attempt was to be made to cross in force at this time. The division issued orders at 10:45 p. m. directing the 54th Infantry Brigade, reinforced by one battalion, 105th Infantry, attached to the

107th Infantry, to take over the front line, and the 53d Infantry Brigade, less one battalion, 105th Infantry, to go into reserve in camps west and northwest of Busigny. [105, 106, 107, 108]

Oct. 12-16 During the night of October 11-12 the 54th Infantry Brigade relieved the 60th Infantry Brigade, 30th Division, on the line, Vaux-Andigny (incl.)—la Haie Menneresse (incl.)—St. Martin Rivière (excl.)—St. Souplet—St. Benin (excl.). The relief was completed at 8 a. m., October 12, and command passed to the 27th Division at that hour. The line was occupied with the 107th Infantry, plus the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, on the right, and the 108th Infantry on the left. [12, 109, 110, 111]

The British 6th Division, British IX Corps, was to the right, and the British 50th Division, British XIII Corps, to the left of the 27th Division. [48, 112]

During the period between this relief and the beginning of the general attack of October 17, the division engaged in active patrolling and observation, but its lines were not advanced. The enemy held the east bank of the Selle opposite the division with outposts in the edge of St. Souplet. His lines continued to include Molain. Across the river and parallel to it was a railroad which, east of St. Souplet, ran over a 30-foot fill. East of the railroad was a low ridge beyond which lay a valley, at the southern end of which was located Ferme de Baudival. Beyond this lay the buildings of L'Arbre de Guise and Ferme de l'Avantage with, still farther east, Jonc de Mer Ferme and La Jonquière Ferme, all organized for defense. Opposite the 27th Division the river was fordable. [48, 101]

Certain adjustments of boundaries were necessary prior to a renewal of the attack. Owing to damming operations by the enemy along the Selle between St. Crepin and Le Cateau, the flooded area in front of the British XIII Corps had increased to such proportions that at no point opposite the British 50th Division was a crossing practicable without bridging operations under close-range fire from the east bank. Pursuant to instructions from the British Fourth Army, the American II

Corps at 7:35 p. m., October 13, ordered the 27th Division to transfer the front south of Vaux-Andigny, inclusive, to the British 6th Division and the front north of St. Souplet, exclusive, to the British 50th Division. [101, 113, 114]

Reliefs were ordered to be completed during the night of October 14-15. On the right, the relief of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, and of the 107th Infantry was completed by the British 9th Norfolk Regiment, 6th Division, at 12:30 a. m., October 15. On the left, the 7th Wiltshires, British 50th Division, completed the relief of the 3d Battalion, 108th Infantry, at 4 a. m., October 15. [115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120]

A message was received from the II Corps on the morning of the 14th directing that identifications be secured. Covered by a barrage, a raiding party of the 108th Infantry crossed the river at St. Souplet at 4 p. m. and took prisoners in the portion of the town east of the river. Patrols sent out on the night of October 14-15 failed to discover any enemy west of the river. [12, 101, 121, 122, 123]

Pursuant to orders of the British Fourth Army, the II Corps had issued preliminary orders on October 14 for an attack with two divisions in line, the 30th and the 27th, from right to left. The 30th Division was to enter the line on the night of October 15-16 and take over part of the sector held by the 27th Division. The latter directed a reorganization of its sector, with the right of its front line opposite the southern edge of St. Martin Rivière. The new divisional front was divided into two brigade subsectors; the 53d Infantry Brigade was to enter the line in the right subsector, relieving elements of the 54th Infantry Brigade. Upon completion of these reliefs, the order of battle in the division was to be the 105th and 108th Infantry Regiments, from right to left. [124, 125, 126, 127, 128]

The reliefs were completed at 6:35 a. m., October 16. The 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry, took over the front line in the right subsector, and the 107th Infantry moved to brigade reserve. [101, 129, 130, 131]

An attack order of the division was issued on October 15 directing an operation on D-day at H-hour northeast of St.

Souplet with brigades abreast. The following objectives were assigned:

First objective: a general north-south line including Jonc de Mer Ferme and La Roue Ferme.

Second objective: a general north-south line through Le Planty.

Exploitation line: a line 50 meters beyond the road leading southeast from Bazuel.

At H-hour the assault units were to advance behind a barrage to the first objective and organize that objective for defense. After a halt of three hours, the support elements were to effect a passage of lines and, accompanied by tanks but without a barrage, were to advance with supporting batteries to the second objective. This line was to be organized as the main line of resistance and exploitation carried out to the designated line. The successive advances of the division were to be coordinated with similar advances by the 30th Division and the British 50th Division. The zone of action of the division was to be as follows:

Right boundary: St. Martin Rivière (excl.)—l'Arbre de Guise (incl.)—le Nouveau Monde (excl.).

Left boundary: St. Souplet (incl.)—la Roue Ferme (incl.)—Bazuel (excl.).

The formation prescribed for the attack was as follows:

<i>54TH INFANTRY BRIGADE</i>	<i>53D INFANTRY BRIGADE</i>
<i>108th Infantry</i>	<i>105th Infantry</i>
<i>1st Battalion</i>	<i>1st Battalion</i>
<i>3d Battalion</i>	<i>2d Battalion</i>
<i>2d Battalion</i>	<i>3d Battalion</i>
<i>Brigade Reserve</i>	<i>Brigade Reserve</i>
<i>107th Infantry</i>	<i>106th Infantry</i>

DIVISION RESERVE

104th Machine-Gun Battalion

[101, 132, 133, 134, 135]

In the 53d Infantry Brigade, the orders prescribed that the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, was to occupy and mop up

Ferme de l'Avantage and L'Arbre de Guise with two companies after the 1st Battalion had passed those places. The 3d Battalion was to continue the advance to the second objective and organize it for defense. The remaining two companies of the 2d Battalion were assigned the mission of advancing in close support to mop up and occupy Jonc de Mer Ferme and La Jonquière Ferme. Exploitation was to be carried out by the two companies previously occupying Ferme de l'Avantage and L'Arbre de Guise. These companies were to pass through the line on the second objective, supported by the two companies assigned to mop up La Jonquière Ferme and Jonc de Mer Ferme. [136]

The 54th Infantry Brigade directed that the 108th Infantry would attack to the first objective, where the 107th Infantry was to make a passage of lines, advance to the second objective and exploit by patrols to the line of exploitation. [137]

The preliminary bombardment was to begin at 8 a. m., October 16, and the infantry attack launched at 5:20 a. m., the following morning. In addition to supporting heavy artillery, the II Corps was assigned the division artillery of the Australian 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th Divisions. The artillery of the Australian 3d Division was assigned to the immediate support of the 27th Division. Brigade machine-gun battalions were to fire a preliminary barrage in their respective zones of action. Ten heavy tanks of the American 301st Tank Battalion, which were attached to the division, were to cross the Selle River after the infantry and were to assist the latter as soon as possible thereafter. One squadron of the British 20th Hussars also was attached to the division for patrol and messenger service. The infantry battalions of the 27th Division were greatly depleted as a result of previous operations. The average rifle strength was now about 200 per battalion. [101, 124, 132]

The division attacked at 5:20 a. m., October 17, as scheduled. Heavy fog, together with the smoke of the barrage, made *Oct. 17* observation and control difficult. The enemy counterbarrage fell along the river before the leading troops could cross. [101]

On the right, the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry, became some-

what disorganized as a result of this counterbarrage. However, the battalion succeeded in crossing and advanced to the railroad embankment, some elements halting at this point. The remainder of the battalion continued the advance, followed by the 2d Battalion. L'Arbre de Guise was captured before 8:45 a. m., and later mopped up by the 2d Battalion. It was held throughout the day in spite of vigorous counterattacks. Portions of the 1st Battalion attempted to advance beyond the first objective, but were unable to do so. The 3d Battalion and elements of the 1st Battalion halted temporarily at the railroad embankment, waiting for the attack on the right to overcome resistance in St. Martin Rivière. The 106th Infantry, advancing in reserve, came under fire from this town. Its 2d Battalion, preceded by tanks, attacked and mopped up the northern portion, and elements of the 118th Infantry, 30th Division, the southern portion. This enabled the 3d Battalion and elements of the 1st Battalion to move toward L'Arbre de Guise. The tanks moved into the zone of action of the 30th Division early in the morning; only one returned to the support of the 27th Division. At the end of the day, Company C, 105th Infantry, together with Company I and elements of the 2d Battalion, were holding L'Arbre de Guise and Ferme de l'Avantage. Units were intermingled and grouped provisionally. The 106th Infantry pushed elements forward to positions in close support of the front line. [12, 73, 101, 138, 139, 140, 141]

On the left, the 1st Battalion, 108th Infantry, followed by support units, part of which soon became intermingled with the assault waves on account of the fog, advanced quickly over the railroad embankment, and about 6:30 a. m. reached the line of Ferme de Baudival. Progress beyond this point was temporarily checked by fire from the farm 700 meters northeast of Ferme de Baudival. An enemy counterattack drove back the right of the British 50th Division shortly after noon, forcing the left elements of the 108th Infantry to conform. The situation was later restored, and the advance continued to the military crest of the ridge about 700 meters east of Ferme de Baudival. The main road to the east of the ridge was occupied by a few observers. The 107th Infantry had advanced east of

St. Souplet during the day. Its 1st Battalion was in close support of the 108th Infantry near Ferme de Baudival. Its 2d and 3d Battalions were west of the farm. [12, 101, 142, 143, 144]

In the afternoon the division ordered that positions, then held, would be consolidated and troops reorganized. Contact with flank divisions, which had been interrupted at times during the combat, was reestablished during this consolidation. [101]

At 8:30 p. m. the British Fourth Army ordered the attack resumed by the British IX Corps in conjunction with the 30th Division at an hour to be arranged between that corps and the American II Corps. The British XIII Corps was to attack in conjunction with the 27th Division at 5:30 a. m. The army objective in the zone of action of the 27th Division was the ridge extending south from Bazuel. After reaching this objective, exploitation was to be carried out to the line of exploitation originally prescribed. Boundaries were unchanged. Orders of the II Corps were transmitted to the 27th Division at 9 p. m.; the 27th and 30th Divisions were to attack at 5:30 a. m., October 18. [145, 146]

The 27th Division issued orders at 10:15 p. m. directing both brigades to continue the attack to the army objectives behind a rolling barrage. Patrols in advance of the starting line of the barrage were to withdraw to the line of departure. The 53d Infantry Brigade ordered the attack with the 105th Infantry in the assault echelon and the 106th Infantry in support. The 105th Infantry was to provide a special mopping-up party for La Jonquièrre Ferme. The 54th Infantry Brigade directed the 107th Infantry to pass through the 108th Infantry and make the attack, employing all three battalions in the front line. The 108th Infantry was to be in support, with one battalion as moppers-up. [147, 148, 149]

At 5:30 a. m. the 105th Infantry, supported by the 106th Infantry, attacked behind the barrage. Resistance was promptly encountered from hedges about 500 meters east of L'Arbre de Guise, Ferme de l'Avantage and from the zone of action of the 30th Division. By 7:10 a. m. the line had reached the road about 700 meters east of Ferme de l'Avantage. By Oct. 18

10:25 a. m. a small group of the 105th Infantry had reached a point about 700 meters south of Jonc de Mer Ferme. Farther advance was impossible because of fire from Jonc de Mer Ferme, La Jonquièrre Ferme and positions northeast of L'Arbre de Guise. [12, 151, 152, 153]

The left regiment of the 30th Division, the 120th Infantry, had advanced beyond the Ribeville—l'Arbre de Guise road, but owing to the situation in the British zone of action, to the right of the 30th Division, this line could not be held. A withdrawal was made to the line of departure, where the regiment remained until 6 p. m. When the 30th Division again attacked later in the day, the 105th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, in the front line, moved forward to a line extending from Jonc de Mer Ferme to the southwest. Preparations were made to hold this line for the night. Patrols were placed on the road southeast of Jonc de Mer Ferme. Company F, 102d Engineers, was posted at Ferme de l'Avantage as a measure against counter-attack. At 6 p. m. the 120th Infantry, 30th Division, resumed the attack, and by 8:30 p. m. had established a line extending northwest from Ecaillon Hameau. The 27th Division established contact to both flanks. [12, 101, 151, 153]

On the left, the 107th Infantry relieved the 108th Infantry at 4:30 a. m. and attacked at the designated hour. Little resistance was encountered until the line, Jonc de Mer Ferme—la Roue Ferme was reached. The latter farm was carried and cleaned up with the assistance of the British 75th Brigade, British 25th Division, which had been attached to the British 50th Division. Jonc de Mer Ferme was reduced by the combined efforts of the 105th and 107th Infantry Regiments. The line, Jonc de Mer Ferme—la Roue Ferme was organized for the night, with contact to both flanks. [12, 101, 154, 155, 156]

To the left of the 27th Division, the British 75th Brigade continued the advance during the day to the outskirts of Bazuel. The British 25th Division assumed command of the zone of the British 50th Division. Patrols carried out exploitation missions during the night. [156, 157]

About midnight the 27th Division issued orders directing

that patrols, supported by artillery fire, would be pushed forward on the morning of October 19 to occupy the ridge 1,500 meters to the east. These orders were transmitted to the front-line units early on the morning of the 19th. [12, 158]

In the zone of action of the 105th Infantry, the advance was not made until daybreak. This regiment and the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, moved forward against slight opposition. The enemy, covered by rear guards, had withdrawn his main body across the Sambre Canal. La Jonquièrre Ferme was reached at 8:45 a. m. and the front line established on the ridge under fire. The 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry, assisted in the action near La Jonquièrre Ferme. Patrols sent forward to the crest of the ridge were driven back. [159, 160, 161]

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On the left, exploitation patrols of the 107th Infantry, sent forward about midnight, October 18, had gained the ridge south of Bazuel by 4 a. m. The 108th Infantry moved forward in close support. [162, 163, 164]

The 30th Division advanced through Mazinghien, but was held up east of the town. Its final position for the day extended the line of the 27th Division to the south. The British 25th Division established a line in Bazuel. [54, 101, 150]

The line which the 27th Division had gained by noon, October 19, was held without change until the division was relieved. Patrolling was carried on to Ruisseau St. Maurice. During the night of October 19-20 the 108th Infantry relieved the 107th Infantry in the front line. [53, 101, 143]

On October 19 the British Fourth Army directed the British IX Corps to relieve the American II Corps. The relief was to be completed on the morning of the 21st. The II Corps announced that the 30th Division would be relieved by the British 1st Division on the night of October 19-20, and the 27th Division by the British 6th Division on the following night. [51, 52]

The 27th Division was relieved during the night of October 20-21 and the morning of October 21. Upon being relieved it moved to the rear of the line in corps reserve, and later, army reserve. [101]

On October 23 the division began to move to the Corbie area, about 10 kilometers east of Amiens. It remained in this area until after the Armistice. On November 23 the division, still less artillery, moved to the American Embarkation Center, Le Mans, for return to the United States. On December 12-14 the 52d Field Artillery Brigade rejoined the division. From February 17 to 26, 1919, the division, less the 102d Engineers, moved to Brest. The 102d Engineers proceeded to Le Havre, and on February 18 sailed for the United States. Sailings from Brest were begun on February 26. The last elements of the division arrived at New York on March 19. [1]

CASUALTIES, SOMME OFFENSIVE

		Sept. 21-28	Sept. 29- Oct. 2	Oct. 3-16	Oct. 17-21	Oct. 22-24	Total
105th Inf.....	W.....	234	441	42	359	2	1,078
	DW.....	12	22	2	20		56
	K.....	38	111	7	52		208
106th Inf.....	W.....	596	164	47	187		994
	DW.....	36	14	3	6		59
	K.....	270	12	2	9	1	294
107th Inf.....	W.....	92	753	169	207	2	1,223
	DW.....	9	57	8	14		88
	K.....	8	338	31	30		407
108th Inf.....	W.....	81	759	291	220		1,351
	DW.....	3	44	6	16		69
	K.....	19	181	17	28		245
104th MG Bn.....	W.....		2	1	7		10
	DW.....				3		3
	K.....				1		1
105th MG Bn.....	W.....	45	19	9	50		123
	DW.....	2	2	1	3		8
	K.....	8	1	5	10		24
106th MG Bn.....	W.....	40	11	6	31		88
	DW.....				2		2
	K.....	5			2		7
102d Engrs.....	W.....	31	96	23	188	1	339
	DW.....	3	2		5		10
	K.....	9	15		16		40
Others.....	W.....	17	27	38	40		122
	DW.....	4	1	2	6		13
	K.....	4	4	1	2		11
Total.....	1,566	3,076	711	1,514	6	6,873	

W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action

Appendix

INFANTRY DIVISION (COMBAT) ORGANIZATION IN EFFECT NOVEMBER 11, 1918

Units	Number of units	Strength
Division Headquarters.....	1	304
Infantry Brigades.....	2	
Brigade Headquarters ¹	1 (2)	25 (50)
Infantry Regiment ¹	2 (4)	
Regimental Headquarters ²	1 (4)	6 (24)
Headquarters Company ²	1 (4)	343 (1, 372)
Machine-Gun Company ²	1 (4)	178 (712)
Supply Company ²	1 (4)	162 (648)
Infantry Battalions ²	3 (12)	
Battalion Headquarters ²	1 (12)	3 (36)
Rifle Companies ²	4 (48)	3, 072 (12, 288)
Machine-Gun Battalions ¹	1 (2)	759 (1, 518)
Medical Department and Chaplains ¹		127 (254)
Ordnance Department ¹		20 (40)
Veterinary Field Units ¹	1 (2)	4 (8)
Field Artillery Brigade.....	1	
Brigade Headquarters.....	1	79
Regiments, 75-mm Gun.....	2	3, 036
Regiments, 155-mm Howitzer.....	1	1, 616
Trench-Mortar Battery.....	1	177
Medical Department and Chaplains.....		96
Ordnance Department.....		49
Veterinary Field Units.....	4	16
Machine-Gun Battalion.....	1	
Battalion Headquarters.....	1	30
Machine-Gun Companies.....	2	356
Medical Department.....		7
Ordnance Department.....		2
Engineer Regiment.....	1	1, 712
Medical Department and Chaplains.....		31
Ordnance Department.....		6
Field Signal Battalion.....	1	488
Trains.....		3, 150
Total.....		28, 105

¹ Upper figures indicate number per brigade. Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.

² Upper figures indicate number per regiment. Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.

³ Upper figures indicate number per battalion. Figures in parentheses indicate number per division.

STRENGTH OF 27TH DIVISION ¹

Units	July 31	Aug. 31	Sept. 30	Oct. 31	Nov. 30
105th Inf.....	2,720	2,599	1,844	1,239	1,716
106th Inf.....	3,003	2,794	1,196	1,293	1,564
107th Inf.....	2,995	2,705	1,622	1,211	1,586
108th Inf.....	3,056	2,888	1,874	1,487	1,788
104th MG Bn.....	342	357	334	317	283
105th MG Bn.....	657	689	616	549	508
106th MG Bn.....	652	650	601	479	509
Total Inf and MG ².....	13,461	12,732	8,152	6,621	8,003
104th FA.....	1,435	1,479	1,447	1,442	1,424
105th FA.....	1,401	1,414	1,395	1,399	1,361
106th FA.....	1,472	1,491	1,470	1,467	1,376
Total FA ³.....	4,536	4,614	4,547	4,543	4,302
102d Engrs.....	1,584	1,494	1,405	1,102	1,144
Others.....	4,462	4,237	3,951	3,742	3,704
Total.....	24,043	23,077	18,055	16,008	17,153

¹ Present with the units of the division; does not include absentees.

² Includes both infantry brigade headquarters.

³ Includes field artillery brigade headquarters and the 102d Trench-Mortar Battery.

GENERAL TABLE OF CASUALTIES

	27th Division	Attached units	Total
Dickebusch Lake and Scherpenberg Sector and Ypres-Lys Offensive.....	1,336	-----	1,336
Somme Offensive.....	6,873	-----	6,873

Sources

The following is a list of the sources on which the statements made in the preceding narrative are based. The numbers refer to the corresponding numbers in brackets at the ends of paragraphs.

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- 13 General Orders No. 18, War Department, Apr. 24, 1923.
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- 17 Map No. 17, 27th Division, Aug. 31—Sept. 2.
- 18 Report of Operations, 30th Division, Oct. 5.
- 19 War Diary, British Second Army, Aug. 23.
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- 21 Orders No. 190, British XIX Corps, Aug. 27.
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- 24 Memorandum, II Corps, Aug. 31.
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- 26 Field Orders No. 36, 27th Division, Aug. 31.
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- 31 Report of Operations, 60th Infantry Brigade, Sept. 21.
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- 35 Message No. G. 162, British XIX Corps, Aug. 31.
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- 37 Field Orders No. 8, 53d Infantry Brigade, Sept. 1.
- 38 Field Orders No. 4, 105th Infantry, Sept. 1.
- 39 Field Orders No. 17, 106th Infantry, Sept. 1.
- 40 War Diary, 105th Infantry, Sept. 1.
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- 42 Orders No. 267, British 41st Division, Aug. 31.
- 43 War Diaries, 53d Infantry Brigade, and 105th and 106th Infantry Regiments, Sept. 2.
- 44 War Diary, British XIX Corps, Sept. 2.
- 45 Orders No. O. A. 222/1, British Advance G. H. Q., Sept. 2.
- 46 War Diaries, British Second and Third Armies, September.
- 47 Report of the First Army, A. E. F.
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- 50 Directive, Allied Commander-in-Chief, Sept. 3.
- 51 Operations Instructions No. 9, Series B, II Corps, Oct. 19.
- 52 Orders No. 20/43 (G), British Fourth Army, Oct. 19.
- 53 War Diaries, 107th and 108th Infantry Regiments, Oct. 19-20.
- 54 Field Message, British XIII Corps, to II Corps, 7 p. m., Oct. 19.
- 55 Report of Operations, Phase E, Australian Corps, Sept. 20-Oct. 6.
- 56 Field Orders No. 15, II Corps, Sept. 23.
- 57 Field Orders No. 45, 27th Division, Sept. 25.
- 58 Field Orders No. 23, 106th Infantry, Sept. 23.
- 59 War Diaries, 106th Infantry and battalions, Sept. 24-26.
- 60 Field Orders No. 47, 27th Division, Sept. 25.
- 61 Field Orders No. 11, 53d Infantry Brigade, Sept. 26.
- 62 Field Orders No. 24, 106th Infantry, Sept. 26.
- 63 Disposition Map, 27th Division, Sept. 27.
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- 65 War Diary, 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, Sept. 27.
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- 68 War Diaries, 106th Infantry and battalions, Sept. 27.
- 69 Report of Operations, 27th Division, Sept. 23-Oct. 2.
- 70 War Diary, 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, Sept. 27.
- 71 War Diary, 2d Battalion, 108th Infantry, Sept. 28.
- 72 War Diary, British Fourth Army, Sept. 27.
- 73 Report of Operations, 118th Infantry, Nov. 27.
- 74 Field Orders No. 49, 27th Division, Sept. 27.
- 75 Map, Plan of Attack, 27th Division, Sept. 29.
- 76 Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 15, Australian Corps, Sept. 25.
- 77 General Orders No. 16, War Department, April 5, 1921.
- 78 Pending Operations Instructions No. 3, G. S. 496/37, and Addendum No. 1, G. S. 496/48, British V Corps, Sept. 27.

- 79 Field Orders No. 20, 54th Infantry Brigade, Sept. 27.
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- 81 War Diaries, 107th Infantry and battalions, Sept. 28.
- 82 War Diary, 106th Infantry, Sept. 28.
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- 84 Report of Operations, 54th Infantry Brigade, Sept. 27–Oct. 2.
- 85 War Diary, 27th Division, Sept. 29.
- 86 War Diary, 2d Battalion, 108th Infantry, Sept. 29.
- 87 War Diary, 106th Infantry, Sept. 29.
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- 97 Field Orders No. 50, 27th Division, Oct. 1.
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- 103 Order No. 42/65 (G), British Fourth Army, Oct. 4.
- 104 Telegram No. 661, G–3, II Corps, to 27th Division, Oct. 10.
- 105 Telegram No. 683, II Corps, to 27th Division, 12:55 a. m., Oct. 11.
- 106 Telegram No. 668, G–3, II Corps, to 27th Division, 11:15 a. m., Oct. 11.
- 107 Telegram No. 675, G–3, II Corps, to 27th Division, 3:11 p. m., Oct. 11.
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- 111 Field Message, 30th Division to II Corps, 9:40 a. m., Oct. 12.
- 112 Field Message, II Corps to British Fourth Army, 5:25 p. m., Oct. 12.
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- 114 Field Message, British IX Corps to II Corps, 2:15 p. m., Oct. 13.
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- 128 Field Orders No. 17½, 53d Infantry Brigade, Oct. 15.
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- 130 War Diary, 107th Infantry, Oct. 16.
- 131 War Diary, 54th Infantry Brigade, Oct. 16.
- 132 Field Orders No. 63, 27th Division, Oct. 15.
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- 134 Field Message, II Corps to 27th and 30th Divisions, 9:50 a. m., Oct. 16.
- 135 Map, Plan of Attack, 27th Division, Oct. 17.
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- 137 Field Orders No. 29, 54th Infantry Brigade, Oct. 16.
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- 139 Field Messages, 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, to 105th Infantry, 10:30 a. m., 3:45 p. m. and 9:15 p. m.; 105th Infantry to 53d Infantry Brigade, 10:35 a. m., Oct. 17.
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- 145 Field Message, British Fourth Army to II Corps, 8:30 p. m., Oct. 17.
- 146 Field Message, II Corps to 27th and 30th Divisions, 9 p. m., Oct. 17.
- 147 Field Orders No. 64, 27th Division, Oct. 17.
- 148 Addenda to Field Orders No. 64, 27th Division, 12:01 a. m., Oct. 18.
- 149 Field Orders No. 19, 53d Infantry Brigade, Oct. 17.
- 150 War Diary, 30th Division, Oct. 19.
- 151 War Diaries, 105th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, Oct. 18.
- 152 Field Messages, 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, to 105th Infantry, 7 a. m. and 10:25 a. m., Oct. 18.
- 153 War Diary, 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, Oct. 18.
- 154 War Diaries, 107th and 108th Infantry Regiments, Oct. 18.
- 155 War Diary, 54th Infantry Brigade, Oct. 18.
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- 160 War Diaries, 2d and 3d Battalions, 106th Infantry, Oct. 19.
- 161 War Diary, British Fourth Army, Oct. 19.
- 162 Field Message, 27th Division to II Corps, 8:50 a. m., Oct. 19.
- 163 War Diaries, battalions of 107th Infantry, Oct. 19.
- 164 War Diary, 54th Infantry Brigade, Oct. 19.

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