Mobile Device Data Collection and Its Security Attack Surfaces

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What Will Be Covered

- Definitions
- Data collection and mobile security
- Mobile application architectures
- Mobile attack vector classes
- Mobile security risks
- Differences between mobile and nonmobile applications
- Conclusions



Definitions



Definitions

- Mobile device handheld device that can have custom applications (apps) installed, such as smartphones (Android, Blackberry, iPhone, and iPad)
- Ordinary computer nonmobile device such as a server or desktop and laptop computers
- Threat a possible danger that might exploit a vulnerability and cause harm,¹ could be intentional or accidental
- Attack an actual attempt to exploit a vulnerability

Definitions

- Vulnerability Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited by a threat source² [NIST SP 800-30]
- Threat model procedure for optimizing network/application/internet security by identifying objectives and vulnerabilities³
- Trust boundary entry point through which anyone could interact with the application³
- Attack vector the way an attacker might attempt to exploit a vulnerability⁴

Data Collection and Mobile Devices



Data Collection and Mobile Devices

- The data collected are often sensitive.
 - Personally identifiable information (PII)
 - Personal health information (PHI)
- Data are not only the property of the device owners, but could contain sensitive data for many hundreds of people.
- In many scenarios the data will be transmitted.
- The data collected are probably covered by some form of regulatory compliance requirements (a YouTube video of a dancing cat is not).



Mobile Application Architectures



Mobile Architectures

Stand-Alone

- Collected data are stored on the mobile device until transferred off of it.
- Client/Server
 - Collected data can be stored on the server but might also be stored on the mobile device.
- Web Browser-Based
 - Collected data are stored on the server.



Mobile Architectures – Trust Boundaries

- All mobile architectures have common trust boundaries.
 - User of the mobile device
 - Final resting place of the collected data and other nonmobile uses for the data, such as "fill ins" subsequent surveys
- Each mobile architecture also has its own unique set of trust boundaries.



Mobile Architectures – Stand-Alone Details

- All of the data collected will be stored on the mobile device
- Transmission of the data will be performed in a controlled environment, such as a USB cable from the device to a nonmobile device
- Full access to all device features (Short Message Service (SMS), phone, contact lists, Global Positioning System (GPS) data, and so on)
- Trust boundary local nonmobile device

Mobile Architectures – Client/Server Details

- The data are <u>usually</u> stored on the server.
- Data may also be stored on the mobile device.
 Authentication information is often stored on the mobile device.
- The data will be transmitted using a wireless network (WiFi, 3G, 4G).
- Encryption may or may not be used during transmission.
- The application has full access to all device features.
- All mobile and web service risk factors apply.
- Trust boundary internet-based web service.

Mobile Architectures – Web Browser Details

- Data are not stored on the mobile device.
- Web browsers cache data, such as security or session tokens.
- Some mobile devices store images of browser screens to increase device performance.
- Data will be transmitted using a wireless network.
- No or very limited access to other device features.
- All vulnerabilities of web applications apply.
- Trust boundary internet-based web application.

Mobile Attack Vector Classes



Four Classes of Mobile Attack Vectors

- **1.** Hardware-centric attacks
- **2.** Device-independent attacks
- **3.** Software-centric attacks
- **4.** User layer attacks⁵



Mobile Security Attack Vectors – Hardware-Centric

- Replacement of the SIM chip
- Forensic Analysis
 - Stolen device
 - Loaned device
 - Changed owner



Mobile Security Attack Vectors – Device-Independent

- Possible man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack
- Rogue base station
- Problems with the encryption protocols
- SMS and MMS protocols are old (2006)
- Possible denial-of-service (DOS) attacks by depleting the mobile device battery
- Requires sophisticated techniques



Mobile Security Attack Vectors – Software-Centric

- Web browser attack vectors from "bad" websites.
 - Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
 - Injection (SQL, Command)
 - Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Malware attack vectors from "bad" apps.

- Information or identity theft
- Eavsdropping
- Financial attacks
- Mobile botnets
- DoS Attack against the mobile device
- Operating system bug vulnerabilities

Mobile Security Attack Vectors – User Layer

- Users don't use security mechanisms correctly.
- Accepting non-authoritative TLS/SSL certificates.
- Shoulder surfing
- Social engineering attacks
 - Phishing
 - Device borrowing



Mobile Security Risks



Common Security Risk Lists

- Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 Mobile Risks³
- European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) Top 10 Smartphone Risks⁶
 - Based on the OWASP Top 10 Mobile Risks
 - Currently include more details of programming best practices

OWASP Top 10 Mobile Risks

- Insecure Data Storage Stand-alone, client/server, possibly web browser-based
- 2. Weak Server-Side Controls client/server, web browser-based
- **3.** Insufficient Transport-Layer Protection client/server, web browser-based
- 4. Client-Side Injection Stand-alone, client/server, possibly web browser-based
- Poor Authentication and Authorization Stand-alone, client/server, possibly web browser-based

OWASP Top 10 Mobile Risks (continued)

- 6. Improper Session Handling client/server, possibly web browser-based
- 7. Security Decisions via Untrusted Inputs Standalone, client/server, possibly web browser-based
- 8. Side-Channel Data Leakage Stand-alone, client/server, possibly web browser-based
- 9. Broken Cryptography Stand-alone, client/server
- **10.**Sensitive Information Disclosure Stand-alone, client/server, possibly web browser-based



Other Risks

- Device Can Be Lost or Stolen
 - Device can be rooted or jail broken and data can be extracted
 - All data on the device can be extracted even if encrypted
- Temporarily Loaned
 - All data on the device can be obtained quickly without the knowledge of the device owner
- Insecure Backup
 - Unencrypted backup could be made
 - To a user's personal machine
 - To the cloud



Other Risks (continued)

App Installation

- The installed apps could be malware
 - Key loggers
 - Transmit PII data to an attacker's server
 - SMS text data to the attacker's phone

Connections to Many Untrusted Networks

- All transmitted data could be sniffed
- Not always safe if 3G/4G is used, can switch to unencrypted WiFi without the owner's knowledge

Differences Between Mobile and Nonmobile Applications



Mobile versus Nonmobile

- Mobile more likely to be lost or stolen than a desktop machine
- Mobile devices might not be controlled by the IT department
 - Can IT wipe an employee's personal device?
 - What happens to sensitive data stored on an employee's personal device when the employee leaves?
- Mobile devices can join many networks, not just the one controlled by IT
- App development environments could be significantly different
 - Managed code (Java/.Net) versus unmanaged (Objective C)

Conclusions

- The mobile security landscape is still in its infancy and constantly changing.
- Mobile devices are vulnerable to all of the same attack vectors as nonmobile devices.
- They are also vulnerable to many new, mobileonly attack vectors.
- Mobile security issues are now at least being discussed.



References

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