

Money Talks: The Effect of Monetary Incentives on Earnings Non-Response in SIPP

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SIPP Has Used Monetary Incentives Since 1996 (Westra, Sunduchki, and Mattingly 2015)

- 1996
 - \$10 and \$20 incentives paid at door in advance in Wave 1
- 2001
 - \$40 conditional discretionary incentive in Waves 1–9
 - \$40 unconditional incentives mailed to prior-wave non-respondents in Waves 4–9
- 2004
 - Non-experimental \$40 discretionary incentives in production (covered about 20 percent of a FR's workload)
 - Tried experimental conditional incentive in Wave 6 to improve conversion rates
- 2008
 - \$20 unconditional incentive with advance letter in Wave 1
 - \$40 discretionary incentive in each wave of panel

SIPP 2014 Multi-Wave Monetary Incentive Experiment

Group	Wave 1	Wave 2	Obs.	Pct.
1	\$0	\$0	14,000	24.1
2	\$0	\$40	14,500	25.0
3	\$20	\$0	14,500	25.0
4a	\$40	\$40	12,000	20.7
4b	\$40	\$0	3,100	5.3

Source: Authors' calculations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 2014, Waves 1 and 2. Observations refer to unique persons for a given wave and incentive group.

Research Questions

- *Do monetary incentives affect earnings non-response?*
 - Earnings non-response rate is 1.3 points lower on average for the incentive group
 - Robust to estimation model, job types, age restrictions, and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
- *If so, does the amount of incentive matter?*
 - Yes; the \$40 incentive is associated with 1.4 points lower earnings non-response compared to the non-incentive group
 - The \$20 is not
- *Are there any direct and indirect effects on attrition?*
 - Yes; the probability of attrition is higher for earnings non-respondents than respondents
 - The \$40 incentive lowers the attrition rate by 5.0 percentage points more than the \$20 group and 2.7 percentage points more than the control group

Data

- SIPP 2014 Waves 1 and 2
 - 2013 and 2014 reference years, respectively
 - Incentive experiment random (Wave 3 targeted based on propensity)
 - \$20 or \$40 (debit card mailed after *completed* interview)
 - Varies across individuals and time
- Any respondent with a *reported* job in the reference period
 - Drop Type-Z persons and all imputed jobs ($EJBn_JOBID > 0$)
 - Primary sample is jobs for employers: $JBORSE = [1, 3]$
- **Outcome:** Earnings non-response indicator r_{it}
- **Treatment:** Incentive receipt indicator I_{it}

Data: Earnings Non-Response r_{it}

- SIPP 2014 collects information for a possible 8 jobs and 2 distinct spells per job
- Earnings:
 - Wage and salary (e.g., hourly, weekly, monthly, annual) ← Up to two changes in the spell
 - Extra earnings (bonuses, tips, commissions, overtime)
- Aggregate to the *person-wave* level ($i = 1, \dots, N; t = 1, 2$)

$$r_{it} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if any earnings component imputed for } i \text{ in } t, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Data: Incentive indicator I_{it}

- Incentives offered at the *household* level
 - Households split into four incentive groups
 - Amounts of either \$20 and \$40 (we generally treat these as the same)
- Multi-wave
 - Time variation in incentive assignment across groups and amount
 - One control group that never received an incentive (i.e., \$0)

$$I_{it} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if respondent } i \text{ in household received a monetary incentive in } t, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Correlated Random Effects Model

- Assume individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity in earnings non-response:

$$(1) \quad r_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta I_{it} + X'_{it}\gamma + u_{it},$$

α_i is individual fixed effects

X_{it} is a vector of observable individual characteristics

Estimation requires eliminating α_i

- Following Mundlak (1978), let $\alpha_i = \psi + \bar{Z}'_i\zeta + \eta_i$:

ψ is a time-invariant component common to all individuals

\bar{Z}'_i is a vector of time average of time-varying covariates (e.g., I_{it} , X_{it} , and wave dummies)

$$(2) \quad r_{it} = \psi + \bar{Z}'_i\zeta + \beta I_{it} + X'_{it}\gamma + e_{it}$$

Summary Statistics by Incentive Receipt (Employer Sample)

Variable	Incentive	Non-Incentive	Difference
Earnings non-response	0.190	0.205	-0.014***
Incentive amount \$USD	34.4	-	34.4***
Proxy response	0.312	0.311	0.001
Household size	3.0	3.0	0.005
In-person interview	0.707	0.684	0.024***
Telephone interview	0.291	0.314	-0.023***
Total job spells in wave	1.2	1.2	0.001
Total jobs in wave	1.2	1.2	0.004
Paid by the hour	0.408	0.409	-0.002
Received extra earnings	0.148	0.142	0.006
Wage and salary earner	0.977	0.978	-0.001
Observations	24,000	28,000	52,000

Source: Authors' calculations from SIPP 2014, Waves 1 and 2. Estimates weighted by annual person weights. Values in relative frequencies unless otherwise noted.


Incentive and Non-Incentive Samples Balanced by Demographics, Education, and Marital Status

Variable	Incentive	Non-Incentive	Difference
Age (in years)	41.5	41.7	-0.176
Men	0.509	0.511	-0.002
White alone	0.796	0.791	0.005
Black alone	0.122	0.122	-0.000
Asian alone	0.052	0.056	-0.004
Other race alone	0.030	0.031	-0.001
Hispanic	0.157	0.158	-0.001
Foreign born	0.173	0.174	-0.001
High school degree	0.260	0.254	0.006
Some college	0.212	0.207	0.005
2-year college degree	0.098	0.100	-0.002
4-year college degree	0.218	0.216	0.002
Advanced degree	0.120	0.132	-0.013***
Married	0.530	0.535	-0.005
Divorced or separated	0.137	0.134	0.003
Widowed	0.019	0.019	-0.001
Observations	24,000	28,000	52,000

Source: Authors' calculations from SIPP 2014, Waves 1 and 2. Estimates weighted by annual person weights. Values in relative frequencies unless otherwise noted.

Average Treatment Effect of Any Incentive Receipt


- Overall, earnings non-response rate is 1.4 points lower for incentive recipients than the non-incentive group
- Treatment effect is slightly greater in Wave 2 than Wave 1



Source: Authors' calculations from SIPP 2014, Waves 1 and 2. Weighted by annual weights.

Average Treatment Effect of Incentive Amounts

- Respondents in all incentive households have lower earnings non-response rates than the non-incentive group
- Only the \$40 incentive relative to the \$0 control is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$)



Source: Authors' calculations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 2014, Waves 1 and 2.

Linear Probability Model Estimates of the ATE

- Incentive lowers earnings non-response by 1.3 points
- Robust to estimation model and inclusion of explanatory variables
- Wald tests reject the hypothesis that unobserved heterogeneity is equal to zero
- Unchanged estimated *ATE* from (2) to (3) and (4) to (5) indicates that unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the incentive effect on earnings non-response.

Variable	OLS			Logit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Incentive eligible	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)
Wave 2	0.032*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.007)	0.019*** (0.007)
Proxy response		0.153*** (0.005)	0.140*** (0.005)	0.144*** (0.010)	0.134*** (0.009)
Telephone interview		0.054*** (0.006)	0.051*** (0.005)	0.040*** (0.008)	0.038*** (0.008)
Log household size (age ≥ 15)		0.018*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.006)	-0.049*** (0.016)	-0.051*** (0.017)
Log total reported jobs		0.026*** (0.008)	0.026*** (0.008)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.041*** (0.014)
Paid by the hour		-0.031*** (0.005)	-0.032*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)
Received extra earnings		0.120*** (0.007)	0.107*** (0.006)	0.132*** (0.012)	0.117*** (0.010)
Include (X_{it} , Z_i)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	43,000	43,000	43,000	43,000	43,000
Clusters	15,500	15,500	15,500	15,500	15,500
R^2	0.002	0.055	0.057	0.056	0.058
Wald $H_0: \zeta = 0$			3.3***		55.7***

X_{it} includes demographics, education, marital status and Z_i includes time average of time-varying covariates

Source: Authors' calculations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 2014, Waves 1 and 2.

Linear Probability Model Estimates of the ATE: Robustness Checks

- Incentive effect robust to age restrictions on the employer sample (**Panel B**)
- Incentive effects robust to job type (**Panel C**)
 - Adds *profits* and *business income* (OINCAMT)
 - Non-response rates relatively higher when include self-employed

	OLS (1)	Logit (2)
Panel A. Employer-only		
Incentive eligible	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)
Observations	43,000	43,000
Clusters	15,500	15,500
R^2	0.057	0.058
Wald $H_0: \zeta = 0$	3.3***	55.7***
Panel B. Employer-only, Age 18–65		
Incentive eligible	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.012*** (0.005)
Observations	40,000	40,000
Clusters	14,500	14,500
R^2	0.057	0.058
Wald $H_0: \zeta = 0$	3.2***	56.5***
Panel C. All Jobs		
Incentive eligible	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)
Observations	47,500	47,500
Clusters	16,500	16,500
R^2	0.056	0.054
Wald $H_0: \zeta = 0$	4.8***	82.1***
Include (X_{it}, Z_i)	Yes	Yes


Source: Authors' calculations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 2014, Waves 1 and 2.

Discussion

- Incentives lower average earnings non-response rate by 1.3 points
- Although there is evidence of unobserved individual heterogeneity, it is uncorrelated with the effect of incentives on earnings non-response
- Understand results in context of the *response continuum model*
 - Individuals vary in time-constant idiosyncratic ways (e.g., propensity to respond)
 - Places them on the response continuum, but that location is unobserved
 - Net effect of incentive depends on counterfactual location on the continuum and average idiosyncratic response to incentive

Response Continuum Model (Yan and Curtin 2010)

The response continuum model



- *Assumption:* incentives lead (on average) to rightward shift along continuum (i.e., increased response propensity)
- Treatment effect on earnings non-response depends on individual-specific counterfactual location on the continuum and Δ_i :
 - A induced to unit response, but initial reluctance manifests as earnings non-response
 - B induced to earnings response (was already unit responder)

Incentives May Lower Attrition Directly and Indirectly


- Response continuum model:

$$H_0: \frac{d}{dr_{it}} \Pr(A_{i,t+1}) > 0,$$

where $A_{i,t+1}$ = attritor

- Regardless of incentive amounts, the probability of attrition is higher for earnings non-respondents than respondents
- Among non-respondents, the **\$40** incentive **lowers** attrition rate by **5 percentage points** more than the **\$20** group and 2.7 points more than the control group (the latter is not significant at the 10-percent level)

Probability of attrition in Wave 2 by earnings response and incentive amount in Wave 1



Source: Authors' calculations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 2014, Wave 1.

Thank you!

Please direct all questions and comments to:

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