

# **A Look at CPS Non-Response and Trends in Poverty**

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**SEHSD Working Paper 2012-21**

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## Abstract

The Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) serves as the data source for official income and poverty statistics in the United States. There is a concern that the rise in non-response to earnings questions could deteriorate data quality and distort estimates of income and poverty. The CPS ASEC relies on a hot deck imputation procedure to address non-response. This paper assesses the extent of the bias in poverty rates caused by earnings non-response and the hot deck procedure. We use a dataset of matched CPS ASEC records to Social Security Detailed Earnings Records (DER) to study the impact of earnings non-response on estimates of poverty over the time period 1997-2008. Initial results show substituting DER earnings data for earnings imputed in the CPS ASEC produces poverty rates that are higher than the official poverty rate but not as high as poverty rates produced from completely dropping imputed earners.

**Key Words:** CPS ASEC, poverty measurement, hot deck imputation, non-response bias, earnings, measurement error

## 1. Introduction

The accurate measurement of the income distribution and poverty statistics is vital to assessing economic growth, characterizing income inequality, and gauging the effectiveness of the federal safety net. The Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) serves as the official source of income and poverty statistics for the United States. CPS ASEC respondents may be reluctant to answer income questions out of concern for response confidentiality, or they may just have insufficient knowledge of the answer (Groves 2001). One method of addressing non-response simply deletes missing data and uses sampling weights to calculate population statistics of interest (Ziliak 2006). An alternative method to address non-response fills in missing data using a matching procedure that relies on matching observations with missing data to observations with complete data based on socioeconomic characteristics (Little and Rubin 2002). This second procedure, referred to as a cell “hot deck,” offers the advantage of retaining more observations in the final data set than simply deleting any observation with missing data; however, the hot deck procedure may bias estimates of population statistics. Hirsch and Shumacher (2004) and Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) study the hot deck procedure in a related survey, the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group, and

show the hot deck procedure causes earnings regression parameters to be biased. Given the bias in regression parameters there is a possibility the hot deck procedure could bias estimates of statistics derived from income such as poverty rates.

This paper assesses the extent of the bias in poverty rates caused by earnings non-response and the hot deck procedure. We assemble a dataset of matched CPS ASEC records to Social Security Detailed Earnings Records (DER) to study the impact of earnings non-response on estimates of poverty. The CPS ASEC-DER matched data file covers CPS ASEC years 1998-2009, allowing for the systematic study of long term trends in income imputation and poverty rates. We present an initial analysis on the bias in poverty rates by substituting DER earnings for CPS earnings. Our analysis recalculates the official poverty rate based on different assumptions on the availability of DER earnings and imputation status of survey respondents.

## **2. Literature Review**

Several papers examine the effect of measurement error and income imputation on poverty. Chesher and Schluter (2002) provide a theoretical treatment of measurement error on various measures of welfare. Their derivations allow a study of the sensitivity of income inequality and poverty measures to the amount of measurement error in the income distribution. The amount of measurement error is characterized by the degree of measurement error variance. Their simulations comparing income distributions with and without measurement error show measurement error can upwardly bias poverty rates and Gini coefficients. Poverty rates measured in surveys may overstate poverty. Chesher and Schluter apply their method to measuring the degree of this bias to regional poverty in Indonesia.

Nicholas and Wiseman (2009) merge administrative data from the Social Security Administration (SSA) with the CPS ASEC 2003 to study poverty among the entire U.S. population and among the elderly for calendar year 2002. Their analysis uses several SSA files for earnings, Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) payments (social security), and SSI payments. Wage and salary earnings come from Summary Earnings Record (SER) and Detailed Earnings Record (DER) files; Social Security benefits come from the Payment History Update System (PHUS) file; and SSI payments come from the Supplemental Security Record file. Using administrative records for SSI payments corrects for underreporting of this benefit in the CPS ASEC. Their analysis substitutes administrative earnings for CPS earnings and self-employment income when available, leaving all other sources of income from the CPS. Nicholas and Wiseman develop measures of income that vary on the availability of administrative and CPS data and employ a reweighting adjustment for CPS observations unmatched to the administrative data. Their results confirm that the CPS substantially understates SSI receipt. They find that using administrative data reduces official poverty rates for the entire national population and for the SSI recipient population. The poverty rate for the entire U.S. population falls from 12.1 percent to between 9.3 percent and 11.8 percent while the SSI poverty rate falls from 44.3 percent to between 39.0 and 40.9 percent. Using a relative measure of poverty, half of equivalence-adjusted median income, has a smaller effect on poverty rates.

Like Nicholas and Wiseman (2009) Turek et al. (2012) use administrative data from the Social Security Administration to study poverty with a focus on the effects of income imputation in the CPS on poverty. Turek et al. merge earnings information from the Detailed Earnings Record file with the CPS ASEC 2006 (calendar year 2005) to examine the effect of substituting DER earnings for reported CPS earnings on income estimates and number of persons in poverty. Their analysis separates individuals by CPS imputation status: no imputes, item imputes, and whole imputes. Item imputes are individuals who respond to the CPS ASEC supplement but need specific income questions imputed. Whole imputes are individuals who refuse to respond to the CPS ASEC supplement and need the entire supplement, including all income questions, imputed. After substituting DER earnings for CPS earnings, an overwhelming majority of individuals do not change poverty status. The poverty status for 93.7 percent of all individuals does not change. This result holds by all three imputation types: no imputes (94.4 percent), item imputes (92.8 percent), and whole imputes (89.2 percent).

This paper differs from the previous literature using administrative records for poverty measurement in several ways. First, the analysis assembles a matched data set covering a long time period, 1997-2008. Second, the analysis examines trends in non-response and imputation and their impact on poverty rates. Third, while previous analyses study different components of income, this analysis focuses on just earnings imputation since earnings account for over 80 percent of income.

### **3. The Current Population Survey Hot Deck Procedure**

The Census Bureau has used a hot deck procedure for imputing missing income since 1962. The current system has been in place with few changes since 1989 (Welniak 1990). The CPS ASEC uses a variation of the cell hot deck procedure to impute missing income and earnings data. The cell hot deck procedure assigns individuals with missing income values that come from individuals with similar characteristics. The hot deck procedure for the CPS ASEC earnings variables relies on a sequential match procedure. First, individuals with missing data are divided into one of 12 allocation groups defined by the pattern of non-response. Welniak (1990) lists the 12 allocation groups and non-response patterns. Examples include a group that is only missing earnings from longest job or a group that is missing both longest job and earnings from longest job. Second, an observation in each allocation group is matched to another observation with complete data based on a large set of socioeconomic variables, the match variables.<sup>1</sup> If no match is found based on the large set of match variables, then a match variable is dropped and variable definitions are collapsed to be less restrictive. This process of sequentially dropping a variable and collapsing variable definitions is repeated until a match is found. When a match is found, the missing income amount is substituted with the reported income amount from the first available matched record. The missing income amount does not come from an average of the available matched records.

For example, suppose the set of match variables consists of gender, race, education, age, and region where education is defined by less than high school, high school, some college, and college or more. If no match is found using this set of match variables, then

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<sup>1</sup> The set of match variables includes gender, race, age, relationship to householder, years of school completed, marital status, presence of children, labor force status of spouse, weeks worked, hours worked, occupation, class of worker, other earnings receipt, type of residence, region, transfer payments receipt, and person status.

the race variable could be dropped and education could be redefined by collapsing education categories to high school or less, some college, and college or more. If no match exists, then region could be dropped to obtain a match. This process of dropping and redefining match variables continues until the only match variable remaining is gender. This sequential match procedure always ensures a match.

#### **4. Data**

The data used for the analysis come from the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) for survey years 1998-2009 (reporting income for 1997-2008). The CPS ASEC is matched to the Social Security Administration's Detailed Earnings Record (DER) file. The Detailed Earnings Record file is an extract of Social Security Administration's Master Earning File (MEF) and includes data on total earnings, including wages and salaries and income from self-employment subject to Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and/or Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) taxation. Since individuals do not make SECA contributions if they lose money in self-employment, only positive self-employment earnings are reported in the DER file (Nicholas and Wiseman 2009). The DER file contains all earnings reported on a worker's W-2 forms. These earnings are not capped at the FICA contribution amounts and include earnings not covered by Old Age Survivor's Disability Insurance (OASDI) but subject to Medicare tax. The DER file also contains deferred wages such as contributions to 401(k), 403(b), 408(k), 457(b), 501(c), and HSA plans. The DER file is not a comprehensive source of gross compensation. Abowd and Stinson (2011) describe parts of gross compensation that may not appear in the DER file such as pretax health insurance premiums and education benefits. Workers in the DER file are uniquely identified by a Protected Identification Key (PIK) assigned by the Census Bureau. The PIK is a confidentiality-protected version of the Social Security Number.

The Census Bureau's Center for Administrative Records Research and Applications (CARRA) matches the DER file to the CPS ASEC. Since the CPS does not currently ask respondents for a Social Security Number, CARRA uses its own record linkage software system, the Person Validation System, to assign a Social Security Number.<sup>2</sup> This assignment relies on a probabilistic matching model based on name, address, date of birth, and gender (NORC 2011). The Social Security Number is then converted to a Protected Identification Key. The Social Security Number from the DER file received from SSA is also converted to a Protected Identification Key. The CPS ASEC and DER files are matched based on the Protected Identification Key and do not contain the Social Security Number.

#### **5. Analysis**

A worker can appear multiple times per year in the DER file if they have several jobs. The DER file is collapsed into one earnings observation per worker per year by aggregating total compensation (Box 1 of W-2), SSA covered self-employment earnings (SEI-FICA), and Medicare covered self-employment earnings (SEI-MEDICARE) across all employers. DER earnings are defined as the sum of total compensation plus the

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<sup>2</sup> The final year the CPS collected respondent Social Security Number is CPS survey year 2005 (calendar year 2004). Beginning with survey year 2006 (calendar year 2005), all respondents were assigned a Social Security Number using the Person Validation System.

maximum of SSA covered self-employment income or Medicare covered self-employment:

$$\text{DER Earnings} = (\text{Box 1 of W-2}) + \max(\text{SEI-FICA}, \text{SEI-MEDICARE})$$

In this way DER Earnings is most compatible with the CPS earnings. CPS earnings (PEARVAL) cover earnings from all wage and salary jobs (WSAL-VAL), business self-employment (SEMP-VAL), and farm self-employment (FRSE-VAL). The CPS total personal income variable (PTOTVAL) used to determine poverty consists of adding a person's total earnings (PEARVAL) to a person's total other income (POTHVAL):

$$\text{PTOTVAL} = \text{PEARVAL} + \text{POTHVAL}$$

The analysis replaces the portion of total personal income due to earnings (PEARVAL) with DER Earnings while keeping income from other sources the same (no change in POTHVAL). Replacing earnings income differs by imputation status and the availability of DER Earnings. An individual's imputation status is determined by having either wages and salary from longest job imputed (I-ERNVAL) or wages and salary from other jobs imputed (I-WSVAL). Poverty is recalculated based on two types of substitutions:

Method 1: Replace CPS Earnings (PEARVAL) with DER Earnings for all persons with a DER match regardless of imputation status and use CPS Earnings for persons without a DER match

Method 2: Replace CPS Earnings (PERNVAL) with DER Earnings for ONLY those persons with imputed earnings and a DER match and use CPS Earnings for persons without a DER match. Use imputed earnings for persons with no CPS Earnings and no DER match.

## 6. Results

Table 1 shows the results of matching CPS ASEC and DER files for CPS survey years 1998-2009.<sup>3</sup> The table displays the person count based on the CPS ASEC person file, the number of earners, the number of matched records, and the match rate. The match rate is defined as the number of earners matched to a DER record divided by the total number of earners. The match rates range from 66 percent to 85 percent. The table also shows the imputation rate among earners. The rate of imputed earnings begins at 16 percent for 1998, rises to 21 percent for 2003-2005, and falls to 19 percent for 2009. The remainder of the table shows how match rates differ by imputation status among earners. Individuals with no imputed earnings are more likely to have a matched DER record. All counts and rates are unweighted. Figure 1 plots the overall match rate for earners and the match rate for earners by imputation status.

Table 2 shows the effect of imputation and replacing CPS earnings with DER Earnings on the official poverty rate. Poverty rates are weighted using the March supplement person weight. Column 1 shows the official poverty rate over the time period while column 3 shows the official poverty rate after dropping individuals with imputed earnings. This comparison gives a sense of the bias introduced by the imputation

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<sup>3</sup> The matched data for CPS survey year 2001 do not include the SCHIP sample expansion. Matched data for survey years after 2001 include the SCHIP sample expansion.

process. Columns 5 and 6 give the difference from the official poverty rate and a test for equality to the official poverty rate at the 10 percent level of significance.<sup>4</sup> Excluding imputed earners from the poverty calculation raises the poverty rate across all years by an average of 0.7 percentage points. Column 7 shows the poverty rate after replacing CPS earnings with DER earnings for all persons regardless of imputation status (Method 1). Comparing this poverty series to the official poverty series for all years excluding 1999-2000 and 2008 still raises the rate but by a smaller amount (average of 0.3 percentage points).

Column 11 shows the poverty rate after replacing CPS earnings with DER earnings for only those persons with imputed earnings (Method 2). Again, the poverty series is higher than the official poverty series, but only for 2001-2008, by an average of 0.3 percentage points. The earlier years, 1997-2000, are not statistically different at the 10 percent level of significance. Figure 2 plots each series and shows the effects of dropping imputed earners and replacing CPS earnings with DER earnings by each Method. Figure 3 plots the difference in each series from the official poverty rate.

## **7. Conclusion and Future Work**

This paper uses a unique dataset of administrative earnings data matched to the CPS ASEC to study the effects of earnings imputation on poverty measurement. Initial results show substituting earnings data for earnings imputed in the CPS ASEC produces poverty rates that are higher than the official poverty rate but not as high as poverty rates produced from completely dropping imputed earners. Future work will further assess data quality by comparing the income responses in the CPS ASEC to the administrative earnings records to provide a sense of how closely aligned the sources are. The analysis so far has focused on the entire population. Future work will also provide estimates of poverty by various demographic groups. A technical issue to address is adjusting poverty rates for unmatched DER records. Table 1 shows not all CPS records are matched to a DER record and match rates vary by imputation status, suggesting the matched sample may differ from the sample used for the official poverty rate. This matched sample should be adjusted for the probability of selection. In this context, the adjustment can be accomplished by multiplying the survey weights by the inverse probability of being matched. With the new weights, unmatched CPS observations can be dropped from the analysis.

## **Acknowledgements**

We would like to thank Martha Stinson, Graton Gathright, and Gary Benedetto for their help in understanding the Detailed Earnings Record files. We also thank Trudi Renwick, Chuck Nelson, Ed Welniak, Adam Bee, and session participants at the 2012 Joint Statistical Meetings for helpful comments. The views expressed in this research, including those related to statistical, methodological, technical, or operational issues, are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions or policies of the Census Bureau. The authors accept responsibility for all errors. This paper is released to inform interested parties of ongoing research and to encourage discussion of

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<sup>4</sup> All comparative statements in this paper have undergone statistical testing, and, unless otherwise noted, all comparisons are statistically significant at the 10 percent significance level.

work in progress. This paper reports the results of research and analysis undertaken by Census Bureau staff. It has undergone more limited review than official publications.

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**Table 1: Match Rate and Imputation Rate**

| Calendar Year | Person Record |         |                       | IF IMPUTED and EARNER |                          |                    | IF NOT IMPUTED and EARNER |            |                        |                   |            |
|---------------|---------------|---------|-----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------|
|               | Count         | Earners | Match Rate (Earnings) | Matched Records       | Earnings Imputation Rate | Matched If Imputed | Total Imputed             | Match Rate | Matched If Not Imputed | Total Not Imputed | Match Rate |
| 1997          | 131,617       | 69,573  | 53,005                | 71%                   | 16%                      | 6,111              | 11,329                    | 54%        | 43,193                 | 58,244            | 74%        |
| 1998          | 132,324       | 70,218  | 49,474                | 66%                   | 18%                      | 5,873              | 12,363                    | 48%        | 40,173                 | 57,855            | 69%        |
| 1999          | 133,710       | 71,783  | 50,661                | 66%                   | 17%                      | 6,079              | 12,492                    | 49%        | 41,071                 | 59,291            | 69%        |
| 2000          | 218,269       | 69,040  | 51,311                | 68%                   | 20%                      | 7,255              | 13,771                    | 53%        | 39,916                 | 55,269            | 72%        |
| 2001          | 217,219       | 113,577 | 89,543                | 73%                   | 20%                      | 12,983             | 22,534                    | 58%        | 69,388                 | 91,043            | 76%        |
| 2002          | 216,424       | 111,698 | 84,692                | 70%                   | 21%                      | 12,510             | 23,097                    | 54%        | 65,235                 | 88,601            | 74%        |
| 2003          | 213,241       | 109,672 | 74,585                | 62%                   | 21%                      | 10,340             | 22,649                    | 46%        | 58,111                 | 87,023            | 67%        |
| 2004          | 210,648       | 108,120 | 71,632                | 61%                   | 21%                      | 10,057             | 22,296                    | 45%        | 55,812                 | 85,824            | 65%        |
| 2005          | 208,562       | 107,532 | 100,013               | 85%                   | 19%                      | 15,631             | 20,016                    | 78%        | 75,786                 | 87,516            | 87%        |
| 2006          | 206,639       | 106,738 | 99,633                | 85%                   | 20%                      | 16,145             | 20,853                    | 77%        | 74,524                 | 85,885            | 87%        |
| 2007          | 206,404       | 107,038 | 99,217                | 84%                   | 20%                      | 16,201             | 21,174                    | 77%        | 74,100                 | 85,864            | 86%        |
| 2008          | 207,921       | 107,134 | 98,764                | 84%                   | 19%                      | 15,086             | 20,014                    | 75%        | 74,981                 | 87,120            | 86%        |


Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement. For information on sampling and nonsampling error, see <www.census.gov/apsd/techdoc/cps/cpsmar10.pdf>. Social Security Administration, Detailed Earnings Record, 1997-2008.

**Table 2: Poverty Rates Based on Differing Assumptions**


| Calendar Year | Official Poverty Rate(%) | Std. Error | (2) | (3)  | (4)                                             |            | (5)                           |                   | (6)                                                            |            | (7)                           |                   | (8)                                                                              |            | (9)                           |                   | (10)                                                                             |            | (11)                          |                   | (12)  |     | (13) |      | (14)  |     |     |
|---------------|--------------------------|------------|-----|------|-------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------|-----|------|------|-------|-----|-----|
|               |                          |            |     |      | Poverty Rate After Dropping Imputed Earners (%) | Std. Error | Difference from Official Rate | Test for Equality | Poverty Rate Using DER Earnings for all Persons (%) (Method 1) | Std. Error | Difference from Official Rate | Test for Equality | Poverty Rate Using DER Earnings for Persons with Imputed Earnings (%) (Method 2) | Std. Error | Difference from Official Rate | Test for Equality | Poverty Rate Using DER Earnings for Persons with Imputed Earnings (%) (Method 2) | Std. Error | Difference from Official Rate | Test for Equality |       |     |      |      |       |     |     |
| 1997          | 13.3                     | 0.211      |     | 13.8 | 0.225                                           | 0.6        | *                             | 13.4              | 0.212                                                          | 0.2        | *                             | 13.4              | 0.212                                                                            | 0.2        | 0.1                           | 13.4              | 0.212                                                                            | 0.2        | 0.1                           | 13.4              | 0.212 | 0.2 | 0.1  | 13.4 | 0.212 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| 1998          | 12.7                     | 0.206      |     | 13.3 | 0.222                                           | 0.6        | *                             | 12.9              | 0.208                                                          | 0.2        | *                             | 12.9              | 0.207                                                                            | 0.2        | 0.2                           | 12.9              | 0.207                                                                            | 0.2        | 0.2                           | 12.9              | 0.207 | 0.2 | 0.2  | 12.9 | 0.207 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| 1999          | 11.9                     | 0.199      |     | 12.4 | 0.213                                           | 0.5        | *                             | 11.9              | 0.199                                                          | 0.1        | *                             | 11.9              | 0.199                                                                            | 0.1        | 0.1                           | 11.9              | 0.199                                                                            | 0.1        | 0.1                           | 11.9              | 0.199 | 0.1 | 0.1  | 11.9 | 0.199 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| 2000          | 11.3                     | 0.193      |     | 12.0 | 0.211                                           | 0.7        | *                             | 11.3              | 0.194                                                          | 0.0        | *                             | 11.3              | 0.194                                                                            | 0.0        | 0.0                           | 11.4              | 0.194                                                                            | 0.1        | 0.1                           | 11.4              | 0.194 | 0.1 | 0.1  | 11.4 | 0.194 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| 2001          | 11.7                     | 0.139      |     | 12.5 | 0.152                                           | 0.8        | *                             | 12.1              | 0.141                                                          | 0.4        | *                             | 12.1              | 0.141                                                                            | 0.4        | 0.4                           | 12.0              | 0.141                                                                            | 0.3        | 0.3                           | 12.0              | 0.141 | 0.3 | 0.3  | 12.0 | 0.141 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| 2002          | 12.1                     | 0.140      |     | 12.9 | 0.154                                           | 0.8        | *                             | 12.4              | 0.142                                                          | 0.3        | *                             | 12.4              | 0.142                                                                            | 0.3        | 0.3                           | 12.4              | 0.142                                                                            | 0.3        | 0.3                           | 12.4              | 0.142 | 0.3 | 0.3  | 12.4 | 0.142 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| 2003          | 12.5                     | 0.142      |     | 13.3 | 0.154                                           | 0.8        | *                             | 12.7              | 0.143                                                          | 0.3        | *                             | 12.7              | 0.143                                                                            | 0.3        | 0.3                           | 12.7              | 0.143                                                                            | 0.3        | 0.3                           | 12.7              | 0.143 | 0.3 | 0.3  | 12.7 | 0.143 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| 2004          | 12.7                     | 0.142      |     | 13.6 | 0.155                                           | 0.8        | *                             | 13.0              | 0.143                                                          | 0.3        | *                             | 13.0              | 0.143                                                                            | 0.3        | 0.3                           | 12.9              | 0.143                                                                            | 0.2        | 0.2                           | 12.9              | 0.143 | 0.2 | 0.2  | 12.9 | 0.143 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| 2005          | 12.6                     | 0.141      |     | 13.3 | 0.152                                           | 0.7        | *                             | 13.0              | 0.143                                                          | 0.4        | *                             | 13.0              | 0.143                                                                            | 0.4        | 0.4                           | 12.9              | 0.143                                                                            | 0.3        | 0.3                           | 12.9              | 0.143 | 0.3 | 0.3  | 12.9 | 0.143 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| 2006          | 12.3                     | 0.139      |     | 13.1 | 0.151                                           | 0.8        | *                             | 12.7              | 0.141                                                          | 0.4        | *                             | 12.7              | 0.141                                                                            | 0.4        | 0.4                           | 12.7              | 0.141                                                                            | 0.4        | 0.4                           | 12.7              | 0.141 | 0.4 | 0.4  | 12.7 | 0.141 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| 2007          | 12.5                     | 0.139      |     | 13.3 | 0.152                                           | 0.9        | *                             | 13.0              | 0.141                                                          | 0.5        | *                             | 13.0              | 0.141                                                                            | 0.5        | 0.5                           | 13.0              | 0.141                                                                            | 0.5        | 0.5                           | 13.0              | 0.141 | 0.5 | 0.5  | 13.0 | 0.141 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| 2008          | 13.2                     | 0.142      |     | 14.0 | 0.154                                           | 0.8        | *                             | 13.2              | 0.142                                                          | 0.0        | *                             | 13.2              | 0.142                                                                            | 0.0        | 0.0                           | 13.6              | 0.143                                                                            | 0.3        | 0.3                           | 13.6              | 0.143 | 0.3 | 0.3  | 13.6 | 0.143 | 0.3 | 0.3 |

Standard errors are estimated using generalized variance parameters. \*p<0.10  
 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1998-2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement. For information on sampling and nonsampling error, see <www.census.gov/apsd/techdoc/cps/cpsmar10.pdf>. Social Security Administration, Detailed Earnings Record, 1997-2008.

**Figure 1: Match Rate By Imputation Status**



**Figure 2: Poverty Rate Based on Differing Assumptions**



**Figure 3: Difference from Official Poverty Rate Based on Differing Assumptions**

